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This thesis compares the Park Jung Hee and Roh Moo Hyun governments’ threat 
awareness and alliance policies, particularly with regard to self-defense and troop 
dispatches in support of the United States. It finds that during the Roh administration, 
domestic political factors led to a deflation of security threats, leading Roh to shift from 
self-reliance to U.S. support via dispatch of troops in order to gain more leverage in 
pursuing the Republic of Korea’s diplomatic preferences. Meanwhile, the Park 
government, influenced by threats to the U.S. alliance, amplified its threat perception, 
leading to an opposite shift from troop dispatch to self-reliance. The thesis concludes that 
in both cases, gaps in threat perception deteriorated the alliance’s solidarity. These 
findings suggest that while Korea is a small power in an asymmetric alliance, its 
domestic factors have the power to significantly impact the alliance’s performance. When 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The Republic of Korea (ROK) has allied with the United States (U.S.) for the past 
60 years; the ROK–U.S. alliance has played critical roles in terms of deterring a war on 
the Korean peninsula and balancing power in Northeast Asia. However, since the ROK–
U.S. alliance is intrinsically an asymmetric relationship, the two states sometimes 
struggle with each other to maintain the alliance. 
South Korea has dispatched significant numbers of troops in support of the United 
States two times, both during the Vietnam War and the Iraq War. Even though South 
Korea has yielded to the United States in response to the security guaranteed by U.S. 
presence, the relationship between the two states has not always been stable.  
With its asymmetric position in mind, South Korea has not only supported the 
United States. through dispatches of troops, but also, in contrast, declared self-reliance 
defense strategies around the times of these dispatches, including during the Park Jung 
Hee and Roh Moo Hyun administrations. But these two administrations did so in opposite 
ways: Park first dispatched troops in support of the U.S. and then declared a self-reliance 
strategy, while Roh declared a self-reliance policy but then dispatched troops in support 
of the U.S. This thesis will investigate connections between the dispatch of troops and 
declarations of self-reliance strategies in South Korea, and ask the following question: 
why did these two administrations change direction (and in different directions)? 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
The ROK–U.S. alliance is an asymmetric relationship. The Republic of Korea, 
which does not have its own military capabilities to deter North Korea, has assured its 
national security through the alliance mechanism. In the absence of deterrence capability, 
South Korea has gained security commitments from the United States and tried to build 
independent deterrent capabilities to handle its North Korean threat.  
2 
Previous studies on the ROK’s self-reliance defense strategy and dispatch of 
troops within the ROK–U.S. alliance context focus primarily on alliance security 
dilemmas: fears of entrapment and abandonment, tradeoffs between autonomy and 
security, and the patron-client relationship. Although some scholars deal with South 
Korea’s changes of attitude toward the alliance and the issue of threat perception under 
the Roh Moo Hyun government, there has been no systematic demonstration of how gaps 
in threat perception are reflected in alliance cohesion. Furthermore, with regard to the 
dispatch of soldiers in support of the U.S. during both the Park and Roh administrations, 
numerous studies describe a causal relation with economic growth, but none addresses 
the correlation (or contradiction) between the dispatch of troops and a self-reliance 
defense strategy.  
Identifying the factors that explain shifts between declarations of self-reliance 
defense policies, on the one hand, and the dispatch of troops, on the other, during the 
Park and Roh administrations might provide South Korea with reference points to help it 
objectively determine and resolve the North Korean threats.  
C.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
This thesis analyzes how the threat perception of South Korea, which is a weaker 
state within an asymmetric alliance, affected ROK–U.S. alliance cohesion, with a focus 
on the Park Jung Hee and Roh Moo Hyun administrations, and with an assumption, for 
the purposes of this thesis, that the U.S. threat perception toward North Korea is 
essentially constant – in other words, that movements by the ROK toward or away from 
the U.S. position in themselves constitute the narrowing or widening, respectively, of any 
gap in ROK–U.S. threat perception. To this end, the thesis reviews literatures on the 
policy patterns of both the Park and Roh governments, the definition of alliance, the 
ROK–U.S. alliance’s cohesion and the definition of alliance cohesion, the asymmetry of 
the ROK–U.S. alliance and factors explaining the ROK’s self-reliance defense strategies 
and dispatches of troops in support of the U.S. during both the Park and Roh 
administrations.   
3 
1. Changes of Policy Patterns in the Park Jung Hee and Roh Moo Hyun 
Administrations 
The Park Jung Hee government had a unusual pattern: a dispatch of troops, 
followed by a self-defense policy line. President Park’s primary concerns after creating 
his government through a military coup in 1961 were the establishment and consolidation 
of the ROK–U.S. alliance. From 1962 on, the USFK withdrawal plan under the Kennedy 
administration had continued; and this was a huge security threat to South Korea, which 
considered itself to be in military confrontation with North Korea. Consequently, Park 
Jung Hee’s regime first proposed to send its troops to the Vietnam War in order to stop 
the USFK withdrawal. As Kyeong Eun Shin argues, the presence of Korean combat 
troops alongside U.S. ground troops in the Vietnam War in 1965 blocked the U.S. 
withdrawal plan on the Korean peninsula.1 Shin further mentions that South Korea’s 
dispatch played a decisive role in blocking the withdrawal of the U.S. troops in South 
Korea, which had been a constant agenda item under the Johnson administration.2 
However, in 1968, as the United States declared the end of the Vietnam War, the 
need for the ROK’s troops was reduced, and discussions on the reduction of U.S. forces 
in Korea began again. Moreover, after North Korean armed guerillas staged the Blue 
House raids on January 213 and the Pueblo incidents occurred on January 23,4 South 
Korea began to develop considerable threat perception toward North Korea. As Shin 
mentions, however, the Johnson administration concluded that while North Korea was 
conducting an intense South Korean provocation, it had no intention of causing a war.5 
                                                 
1 Kyeong Eun Shin, “The Reasons of Ceasing and Resuming Discussions on Withdrawal of U.S. 
Forces in Korea during the Johnson Administration: Korean Combat Troops’ Dispatch to Vietnam and 
Management of Alliance Security Dilemma,” (master’s thesis, Seoul National University, 2013), 54, 
http://www.riss.kr/search/detail/DetailView.do?p_mat_type=be54d9b8bc7cdb09&control_
no=7626b78992c7bd0dffe0bdc3ef48d419#redirect. 
2 Shin states that with the deployment of Korean troops, the debate on the withdrawal of the USFK 
was postponed indefinitely. Shin, “The Reasons of Ceasing and Resuming Discussions on Withdrawal of 
U.S. Forces in Korea during the Johnson Administration,” 32. 
3 The Blue House raid was an incident in which 31 North Korean armed military guerilla were trying 
to assassinate President Park Jung Hee and the Korean government officials on January 21, 1968. 
4 The Pueblo incident occurred when on January 23, 1968, the U.S. intelligence ship ‘Pueblo’ on the 
high seas off the coast of Wonsan was kidnapped by the North Korean Navy. 
5 Shin, “The Reasons of Ceasing and Resuming Discussions on Withdrawal of U.S. Forces in Korea 
during the Johnson Administration,” 66. 
4 
As a result, the United States sought to resolve the issue quietly through negotiations with 
North Korea, without prior coordination with South Korea. This caused considerable 
tension with South Korea, which insisted on a hard response to North Korea, such as a 
total war. President Park, as cited by Sang Chul Cha, stated in a speech at the graduation 
ceremony of Seoul National University on February 26, 1968: 
In order for us to live, we must keep this nation with our power. When we 
lack our power, it is natural to get help from others. However, you should 
not expect that other keep you. I call this the subjectivity of national 
defense. We must cultivate the subjective capability to pioneer the destiny 
of our nation.6 
President Park’s speech, as Chul Ho Cho emphasizes, was the first step toward 
promoting South Korea’s independent self-defense policy. 7  In late 1968, as North 
Korea’s provocations increased unprecedentedly, the security crisis in South Korea 
reached its peak. However, in 1969, new U.S. President Nixon proclaimed the Guam 
doctrine (better known as the Nixon Doctrine), arguing that Asian countries should take 
responsibility for their own security, and the U.S. sought to further accelerate the 
withdrawal of their military in Korea. 
The Nixon Doctrine, alongside the repeated and widespread provocations of 
North Korea, created a great security crisis for Park’s regime. In particular, Nixon’s 
unilateral move toward withdrawal of the USFK, which had functioned as a deterrent 
“trip wire” on the Korean peninsula, made Park concerned about abandonment by the 
U.S. As Cho states, distrust toward the United States led Korea to foster its own defense 
industry and self-defense policy, and further prompted South Korea to envision nuclear 
development, starting in the early 1970s. 8  Although some scholars identify different 
causes of Park’s self-defense policy, the Park government’s policy direction seems to 
have shifted from alliance loyalty to securing autonomy. 
                                                 
6 Sang Chul Cha, “President Park Chung-hee and the ROK-U.S. Alliance in the 1970s,” (author’s 
translation) Military History 75 (June 2010): 337, http://www.dbpia.co.kr/Article/NODE06508716.  
7 Chul Ho Cho, “President Park Chug Hee’s National Defense Policy of Self-Reliance and the 
Development of Nuclear Weapons,” (author’s translation) Critical Review of History 80 (August 2007): 
359, http://www.dbpia.co.kr/Article/NODE00873706. 
8 Cho, “President Park Chug Hee’s National Defense Policy of Self-Reliance and the Development of 
Nuclear Weapons,” 363. 
5 
In the Roh Moo Hyun administration, the reverse policy direction can be seen, 
and the reversal occurs over a fairly short period of time. As Jae Young Hur and Ki Hong 
Eom put it, President Roh Moo Hyun expressed his strong commitment to South Korea’s 
self-defense from the time of his presidential candidacy in 2002.9 Roh emphasized an 
equal standing with the United States and expressed his desire for the return of wartime 
operational control (OPCON) and establishment of self-defense.10 Moreover, as Hur and 
Eom further highlight, he officially revealed his willingness to pursue self-defense 
through the National Liberation Day celebration of August 15, 2003.11 
In the midst of self-defense initiative, in April 2003, the Roh government 
dispatched 673 medical support and engineering troops to Iraq. Since this first dispatch 
was a small unit composed of only non-combatants, it cannot be considered equivalent to 
the Park regime’s dispatch of combat soldiers. Yet according to Samuel Len, as the Iraq 
War continued longer than expected, the Roh government, at the request of the United 
States, dispatched 3,000 soldiers, including “combat-ready special forces and marines,” 
to Iraq in February of the following year.12 It was the third largest military force in Iraq, 
after the United States and United Kingdom. Thus, under the Roh administration, South 
Korea pursued the opposite reversal: from self-defense policies to the dispatch of soldiers 
in support of the US.  
Some scholars, however, assess that self-defense policies persisted during his 
tenure. Young Ho Kim states that President Roh proposed a concept of “cooperative self-
reliant defense” and continued to pursue South Korea’s own defense capabilities along 
                                                 
9 Jae Young Hur and Ki Hong Eom, “The Perception of President Roh Moo Hyun on Self-Reliant 
National Defense: Content Analysis of Presidential Speeches,” (author’s translation) Journal of East and 
West Studies 24, no.4 (2012): 39–40, http://kiss.kstudy.com/journal/
thesis_name.asp?tname=kiss2002&key=3119380. 
10 Hur and Eom, “The Perception of President Roh Moo Hyun on Self-Reliant National Defense,” 39–40. 
11 Hur and Eom, 42.  
12 Samuel Len, “South Korea Approves 3,000 Troops for Iraq,” New York Times, last updated 




with the development of the ROK–U.S. Alliance.13 Since this can be a controversial 
issue, this thesis will deal with this problem in greater detail by analyzing Roh’s alliance 
policy patterns. 
2. Definition of Alliance 
The definition of an alliance should be the first step in the thesis because it 
defines alliance cohesion and provides implications for the cracking of the asymmetric 
alliance.  
Generally, an alliance is a political promise to actively respond to common threats 
by ensuring that a sovereign state is provided military cooperation by other countries. In 
previous studies, many scholars have defined an alliance. This thesis, rather than 
selecting one of them, makes an operational definition of an alliance based on the claims 
of existing scholars. According to Stephan Walt, “an alliance is a formal or informal 
relationship of security cooperation between two or more sovereign states.” 14  Walt 
emphasizes that the purpose of forming an alliance is to overcome common potential 
threats with “aggregate power” in a security crisis.15 In the same context, George Liska 
argues that an alliance “associates like-minded actors in the hope of overcoming 
rivals.”16 Glenn Snyder defines alliances as “formal associations of states for the use (or 
nonuse) of military force, in specific circumstances, against states outside their own 
membership.” 17  Snyder further argues that “an alliance can be a result of a formal 
                                                 
13 Young Ho Kim,”Hyuprukjeock Jajugukbangua Han∙Mi Dongmaeng: Jaengjeomgua Guaje,” 
협력적 자주국방과 한∙미동맹:쟁점과 과제 [Cooperative Self-Defense and The ROK-U.S. Alliance: 
Issues and Challenges] (author’s translation) in Korea Institute for National Unification Conference Edition 
(May 2004): 119–120, http://www.dbpia.co.kr/Article/NODE01386383; On October 1, 2003, unlike 
before, President Roh made his first mention of “Cooperative Self-reliant defense” in the Korean Armed 
Forces Day. Hun Chul Shin, “Roh Jajugukbang Jaegangjo Baekyung.” 노 자주국방 재강조 배경 
[Background of Roh’s Re-emphasis on the Self-National Defense] (author’s translation) Daily Business 
Newspaper, last updated October 1, 2003, http://news.naver.com/main/
read.nhn?mode=LSD&mid=sec&sid1=100&oid=009&aid=0000318961; Jae Young Hur and Ki Hong 
Eom, “The Perception of President Roh Moo Hyun on Self-Reliant National Defense,” 42.  
14 Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), 12. 
15 Walt, The Origins of Alliances, 22. 
16 George Liska, Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1968), 3. 
17 Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 4. 
7 
agreement of some sort that makes explicit the contingencies in which military 
cooperation will occur.”18  
On the other hand, as James Morrow’s critique describes, states “form alliances to 
increase their security by massing their capabilities against a common enemy.”19 Morrow 
emphasizes that “the common interest [of an alliance] is generally to be the deterrence or 
defeat of a mutual threat.”20 Robert Osgood defines the alliance more strictly as 
a formal agreement that pledges states to co-operate in using their military 
resources against a specific state or states and usually obligates one or 
more of the signatories to use force, or to consider (unilaterally of in 
consultation with allies) the use of force, in specified circumstances.21 
Morrow further emphasizes that the alliance should not hesitate to use illegal 
forces to counter common threats in terms of a “collective security” agreement.22 As a 
whole, one can define an alliance as a collective partnership between two or more 
countries to ensure their security based on mutual robust military support in response to a 
common enemy. 
a. Abandonment- Entrapment Dilemma 
However, as Snyder argues, once an alliance is formed, the security dilemma - 
entrapment and abandonment— between allies takes place because of opportunity costs 
between security benefits and autonomy costs. 23 To put this another way, as Snyder 
describes, since the national interests expected in an alliance differ, whether each state 
can be convinced of the other’s security commitment is a key issue in an alliance’s 
                                                 
18 Snyder, Alliance Politics, 4. 
19 James D. Morrow, “Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model 
of Alliances,” American Journal of Political Science 35, no. 4 (November 1991): 904, http://www.jstor.org/
stable/2111499. 
20 Morrow, “Alliances and Asymmetry,” 905. 
21 Robert E. Osgood, Alliances and American Foreign Policy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1967), 17. 
22 Osgood, Alliances and American Foreign Policy, 17. 
23 Glenn H. Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics,” World Politics 36, no.4 (July 1984): 
466, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010183. 
8 
management. 24  In some sense, both defense commitments and substantial military 
assistance between allies are critical factors to consolidate it. 
Assuming a state is a rational actor aiming to maximize its own national interests, 
allies’ policies that harm another’s national interests can sway an alliance. In this sense, 
as Snyder mentions, entrapment and abandonment badly hamper an alliance’s 
cohesion.25 According to Snyder, entrapment is 
being dragged into a conflict over an ally’s interests that one does not 
share, or shares only partially…Entrapment occurs when one values the 
preservation of the alliance more than the cost of fighting for the ally’s 
interests. It is more likely to occur if the ally becomes intransigent in 
disputes with opponents because of his confidence in one’s support. Thus, 
the greater one’s dependence on the alliance and the stronger one’s 
commitment to the ally, the higher the risk of entrapment.26 
More specifically, in an asymmetric alliance in which a kind of “client-patron” 
relationship is formed due to a difference of national power, small powers are dependent 
on major powers in terms of security benefits. In this sense, the burdens of entrapment 
imposed on powerful states are relatively high. On the other hand, a weaker country can 
pursue its own national interests by utilizing entrapment. As a result, as James Morrow’s 
argument implies, unwanted security costs for great powers’ allies motivate them to 
disconnect their ties with weaker countries.27 In a sense, since an alliance is a trade 
relationship that exchanges desired national interests, a loss of benefit on either ally’s 
preference can disrupt the transaction.  
At the same time, the danger of abandonment can also exacerbate an alliance’s 
solidarity. According to Snyder, abandonment is 
worry about being deserted by one’s ally. The worry arises from the 
simple fact that the ally has alternative partners and may opt for one of 
them if it becomes dissatisfied with present company. There are two 
                                                 
24 Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics,” 466. 
25 Snyder, 466. 
26 Snyder, 467. 
27 James D. Morrow, “Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model 
of Alliances,” 916. In addition, Glenn Snyder explains that “[as] the cost of abandonment is a serious loss 
of security, the cost of entrapment is an extreme form of lost autonomy.” Snyder, Alliance Politics, 181. 
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components in this fear of abandonment: the subjective probability that the 
partner will defect and the cost to oneself if it does.28 
In some sense, one can interpret the fear of defection as psychological anxiety 
about an alliance relationship in the future. As Snyder further explains, since the fear of 
abandonment, which weaker countries feel in asymmetric alliances, is possibly equated 
with their security crises, small powers show loyalty to great powers to avoid defection.29 
However, responding to the probability of defection, weaker countries also choose a risky 
option, like threatening “to defect oneself unless the ally becomes more supportive.”30 
Above all, as Snyder puts it, since the ambiguous or unclear security commitments of 
great powers aggravate the security unrest of weaker countries, small powers more often 
tend to take such a risk.31 Hence, a lack of strong commitment by major powers can 
deteriorate an alliance.  
Similarly, due to the paradoxical relationship between abandonment and 
entrapment, an alliance experiences constant conflict over the long term. Above all, 
alliance conflict based on this security dilemma is more severe in an asymmetric alliance. 
Because an asymmetric alliance can impose too strong a fear of abandonment on weaker 
countries, they make an effort to balance their relations with stronger states. However, 
since this can conflict with the national interests of great powers, these efforts can deepen 
tensions in alliance politics. Taken together, the actions of allies who want to reduce a 
single particular peril create other risks in the process, entrapment and abandonment can 
be the “security-autonomy trade-off”32 in alliance management rather than a dilemma. 
Since entrapment and abandonment are incessant between allies, it is eventually 
impossible to eradicate the dilemma. As a result, we should handle the security dilemma 
in an alliance in terms of alliance management.  
                                                 
28 Snyder, Alliance Politics, 181. 
29 Snyder, 183. 
30 Snyder, 184. 
31 Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics,” 473. 
32 Snyder, Alliance Politics, 180. 
10 
b. Threat Perception’s Role in Alliance Cohesion 
Threat perception can affect a relationship between allies. As Janice Stein argues, 
since threat perception can shape a country’s foreign and domestic policies, it naturally 
alter the country’s international relations. 33  A country’s threat perception is largely 
determined by four elements: self-threat perception, the capabilities and intentions of its 
enemies, and the security commitment of its allies. Stein suggests that while enemies’ 
military capabilities are an objective risk, the remaining factors are subjective risks based 
on emotional and psychological estimations.34 In other words, the latter three factors play 
more decisive roles in forming a country’s threat awareness. Table 1 breaks down the 
determinants of threat perception in an ally.  
Table 1.   Threat Perception Subdivision in an Alliance35 










Enemy Military Capability Objective Physical 
Factor 







The work of Robert Jervis, as discussed by Janice Stein, argues that “[if] the 
sender’s commitments are not credible to the receiver, the receiver may not perceive their 
meaning and consequently choose an inappropriate course of action.” 36  To be more 
                                                 
33 Janice Stein, “Threat Perception in International Relations,” in The Oxford Handbook of Political 
Psychology, ed. Leonie Huddy, David O. Sears, and Jack S. Levy (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2013): 20, doi: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199760107/013.0012. 
34 Stein, “Threat Perception in International Relations,” 18. 
35 Adapted from Kyeong Eun Shin, “The Reasons of Ceasing and Resuming Discussions on 
Withdrawal of U.S. Forces in Korea during the Johnson Administration: Korean Combat Troops’ Dispatch 
to Vietnam and Management of Alliance Security Dilemma,” 11. 
36 Stein, “Threat Perception in International Relations,” 3. 
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specific, the degree of credibility in the security assistance of an alliance, combined with 
external threats, influences a state’s fears and provides motivation to seek changes in 
alliance policies. Thus, threat awareness can not only violate the other party’s diplomatic 
preferences but also impact its solidarity. 
Similarly, taking an asymmetric alliance as an example, the fear of abandonment 
can deepen small powers’ threat perception against adversaries. As Snyder illustrates, 
since “the costs and risks of abandonment will outweigh the costs and risks of 
entrapment,” small powers conduct multi-dimensional efforts toward major powers.37 In 
terms of deterrence, for weaker countries that rely on the security umbrella of great 
powers, isolation from the security mechanism implies an imminent and direct exposure 
to the military threats of enemies. As a result, the possible breakdown of an alliance can 
create existential threat perception for small powers. This perception might lead to 
inadequate behavior by small powers, such as attempts to disconnect an alliance with 
great powers despite the weaknesses of their military capabilities. Ultimately, a shift of 
threat perception, originating from the fear of abandonment, can impact an alliance’s 
cohesion. 
3. The ROK–U.S. Alliance’s Cohesion and Definition of Alliance 
Cohesion  
This thesis will discuss the ROK–U.S. alliance cohesion interchangeably with the 
dispatch of combat troops and self-defense policy, since each represents a degree of 
loyalty to the US. In this section, based on the definition of the alliance, this thesis 
investigates the ROK–U.S. alliance’s cohesion and what alliance cohesion means. 
Previous studies mainly argue that elements such as U.S. commitment and threat 
perception are important factors in determining the ROK–U.S. alliance’s cohesion, and 
South Korea’s influence on alliance cohesion tends to be neglected. Generally, anti-
American sentiment in South Korea creates tension in the ROK–U.S. alliance, but there is 
no direct correlation with South Korea’s self-defense policy.  
                                                 
37 Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics,” 472. 
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Scholars have different opinions on the factors that determine ROK–U.S. alliance 
cohesion. First, Victor Cha states that although the ROK–U.S. alliance had held, 
“drawing its strength and cohesion from a clear combined mission and a commonly 
perceived threat,” through the political conflicts between the Bush and the Roh Moo 
Hyun administration in the process of resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis in the 
early 2000s, the alliance could be “at worst destroyed.” 38 Cha points out that if the 
United States does not provide commitment through visible means, alliance cohesion can 
be significantly weakened.39 From a viewpoint opposite to that of this thesis, Kwang Il 
Noh insists that “dominant U.S. threat perception drives the strength of the alliance.”40 
Noh argues that through four variables, the cohesion of the ROK–U.S. alliance has 
changed depending on the degree of security threat that the United States feels. 41 
Conversely, Dong Woo Kim analyzes the alliance solidarity based on “the U.S. military 
spending,” but he concludes that “there is no causal relationship between the two 
variables.”42 Kim emphasizes that even if the U.S. cuts off its military expenditure for the 
alliance, the ROK does not need to feel an alliance security dilemma.43 Although these 
studies analyze the alliance bond through objective indicators, the failure to address 
Korea’s influence as a variable remains a limitation. 
On the other hand, Bon Cheol Koo argues that shared political, economic, and 
cultural identities between Korea and the U.S. are the factors that reinforce the alliance’s 
                                                 
38 Victor D. Cha, “Shaping Change and Cultivating Idea in the U.S.-ROK Alliance,” in The Future of 
America’s Alliance in Northeast Asia, ed. Michel H. Armacost and Daniel I. Okimoto (Stanford, CA: Asia 
Pacific Research Center, 2004), 122. 
39 Cha, “Shaping Change and Cultivating Idea in the U.S.-ROK Alliance.” 125. 
40 Kwang Il Noh, “The Impact of Changes in Dominant U.S. Threat Perception on the Cohesion of the 
U.S.-ROK Alliance,” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2014), 98, http://hdl.handle.net/10945/
44633. 
41 Noh, “The Impact of Changes in Dominant U.S. Threat Perception on the Cohesion of the U.S.-
ROK Alliance,” 98. 
42 Dong Woo Kim, “The Relationship between U.S. Military Spending and the Cohesion of the ROK-
U.S. Alliance,” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2016), 77–78, http://hdl.handle.net/10945/
51557. 
43 Kim, “The Relationship between U.S. Military Spending and the Cohesion of the ROK-U.S. 
Alliance,” 77. 
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cohesion.44 Koo also holds that although the economic growth and ideational changes of 
South Korea caused partnership tension with the US, the alliance has developed into a 
more equal and mature relationship through these conflicts.45 However, Koo’s study is 
not very different from previous research, as it depends on how much Korea shares US-
centric identities.  
Moreover, given existing studies on alliance cohesion, it is necessary to redefine 
the term. Since an alliance is not a one-sided subordinate relationship, weaker states can 
also influence the strength of an alliance. Scholars explain cohesion as follows. First, 
Holsti et al. explain that alliance cohesion is “the ability of alliance partners to agree upon 
goals [: deter and overcome a common enemy], strategy, and tactics, and to coordinate 
activities directed toward those ends.”46 They further analyze five elements that impact 
alliance cohesion: “threat, decision making structure, [alliance] size, [military] 
capabilities and the credibility of deterrence, and national attributes.”47 Of these factors, 
when just focusing on the external threat and credibility of deterrence, as Holsti et al. 
suggest, “external pressure tends to create internal cohesion.”48 In addition, they argue, 
the credibility of an ally’s commitments to protect in a security crisis has significant 
impact on alliance persistence.49   
On the other hand, Friedman et al. hold that “an alliance derives its solidarity 
from its common purpose.”50 Moreover, they explain that “what weighs most heavily for 
unity in an alliance is agreement on matters directly bearing on alliance, such as those 
concerned with identification and treatment of opponents before and after hostilities.”51 
                                                 
44 Bon-cheol Koo, “The Impact of Changes in State Identity on Alliance Cohesion in Northeast Asia,” 
(master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2016), 113, http://hdl.handle.net/10945/4412. 
45 Koo, “The Impact of Changes in State Identity on Alliance Cohesion in Northeast Asia,” 113. 
46 Ole R. Holsti, Terrence P. Hopmann and John D. Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in 
International Alliances: Comparative studies in behavioral sciences (New York: Wiley, 1973), 16. 
47 Holsti, Hopmann and Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances, 16–24. 
48 Holsti, Hopmann and Sullivan, 17. 
49 Holsti, Hopmann and Sullivan, 17.  
50 Julian R. Friedman, Christopher Bladen and Steven Rosen, Alliance in International Politics 
(Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1970), 288.  
51 Friedman, Bladen and Rosen, Alliance in International Politics, 288. 
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In this sense, alliance cohesion can reach optimum performance when allies recognize 
and respond to external threats identically and consistently. If one ally departs from the 
collective direction, enemies impose hostilities to test the resistance of the alliance. 
Similarly, in investigating alliance stability, George Liska holds that since all 
alliances have fragile factors, allies must show their commitment to prevent the alliance 
from wavering, providing benefits and trust to its partners. 52  In other words, if the 
alliance is asymmetric, a relatively small state should demonstrate stronger commitments 
to maintain cohesion. Accordingly, within an asymmetric alliance, coerced policy 
decisions can appear, and, above all, the weaker state is more likely to suffer 
inconsistency in alliance politics based on the intensity of the threat and self-determined 
threat perception. Contradictions of alliance policy caused by threat recognition directly 
reveals that the alliance drifts. 
Based on these researchers’ discussions of alliance cohesion, this research argues 
that threat perception disparity between allies, in particular that caused by the weaker 
state’s threat perception, could be a determinant factor of the alliance’s cohesion. 
Furthermore, the thesis redefines alliance cohesion as consistency of general foreign 
policy. The inconsistency of alliance policies, which is particularly a phenomenon in an 
asymmetric relationship, directly reveals that the alliance drifts. 
4. Asymmetry of the ROK–U.S. Alliance  
Asymmetric alliances, as Young Joon Kim suggests, are similar to general 
alliances “regardless of types, purpose [and performance].” 53  However, conflictual 
factors are contained within the relationship because national strategies and interests and 
common enemies are differently recognized.  
Robert Rothstein defines a small power as 
a state which recognized that it cannot obtain security primarily by use of 
its own capabilities, and that it must rely fundamentally on the aid of other 
                                                 
52 Liska, Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence, 108. 
53 Young Joon Kim, “Appeasing the Fear of Abandonment in Asymmetric Alliance: The ROK-U.S. 
Alliance Case,” (author’s translation) Institute of East and West Studies of Yonsei University 11, no.4 
(December 2014): 81, http://kiss.kstudy.com/journal/thesis_name.asp?tname=kiss2002&key=3322953. 
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states, institutions, processes, or developments to do so; the Small Power’s 
belief in its inability to rely on its own means must also be recognized by 
the other states involved in international politics.54 
In this sense, since Korea does not have its own military capabilities to deter and 
defeat North Korean threats—in particular, nuclear attacks—it should be considered a 
small state. Furthermore, in terms of national power, as Woo Tae Lee emphasizes, “the 
ROK–U.S. alliance is an asymmetric tie between a powerful and a weak country in which 
there is a marked difference in national power among allies.”55 In particular, since Korea 
historically did not have options to choose its ally, the ROK–U.S. alliance is 
fundamentally an asymmetric relationship. Lee further argues that 
Korea, which had to depend on the survival issue of the nation in the 
course of the Korean War, handed over the ROK military’s operational 
control to the United States, and after the Korean War, Korea established 
the ROK–U.S. alliance based on the ROK–U.S. mutual defense treaty with 
the U.S., in order to ensure its [national] security. In this process, Korea 
was not in a position to choose an ally, but rather in a position to wait for 
U.S. choice in order to secure its security and survival ... In addition to the 
situation in which the alliance was established, the ROK–U.S. alliance 
was basically an asymmetric alliance between the great power and small 
power where the differences in national power between the allies were 
remarkable.56 
Moreover, some scholars explore alliances in terms of the balance of power. As 
cited by Lee, Michael Handel states that “cracks arising from asymmetric alliances are 
exacerbated when a powerful state, for the purpose of maintaining their global balance of 
power, does not compete with common enemies and proceeds to cooperative relations 
with them.”57 Thus, as Lee further states, from the standpoint of South Korea, 
the national security and survival arising from the North Korean military 
threats are the greatest national interests and a fundamental reason for 
                                                 
54 Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), 
29. 
55 Woo Tae Lee, “The Strengthening of the Korea-U.S. Alliance and Its Asymmetry,” (author’s 
translation), The Journal of Political Science & Communication 19, no.1 (February 2000): 62, 
http:/www.dbpia.co.kr/Article/NODE06616402.  
56 Woo Tae Lee, “The Strengthening of the Korea-U.S. Alliance and Its Asymmetry,” 62. 
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Korea to establish the ROK–U.S. alliance, but the alliance between the 
two countries cannot be symmetrical and horizontal in that the United 
States maintains its political, economic and military influence at the global 
level, while it pursue the balance of power [on the Peninsula].58 
In a similar vein, Professor Su Hyong Lee argues that “an asymmetric alliance is not only 
unequal in the sense of gain and loss, but also imbalanced in responsibility and 
expectation toward its partner.” 59 Since national strategies and interests are different 
within an asymmetric alliance, interpretations about the external environment 
surrounding the alliance could be dissimilar, or conflictual. As a whole, through existing 
studies of weak countries and asymmetric alliances, the ROK–U.S. alliance is seen as a 
typical asymmetric alliance. Despite the expansion of Korea’s national power since the 
end of the Cold War, the alliance’s structural character still remains unchanged. 
5. Causes of Self-Reliant Defense Strategies and Dispatch of Troops for 
the U.S. during Both the Park and Roh Administrations   
Most previous studies of the Park Jung Hee and Roh Moo Hyun governments on 
self-defense and dispatching policies largely took independent approaches to the causes 
of each policy. In particular, the argument that the alliance security dilemma was a main 
factor in determining the policy of a weaker state within the asymmetric alliance is weak, 
in terms of overly limiting the autonomy attributed to a small state in international 
relations. 
With regard to self-reliance defense policies, existing studies focus primarily on 
the purpose of overcoming the asymmetric alliance dilemma. Overall, previous research 
shows that Park’s self-reliance policy was based on the fear of abandonment induced by 
the unilateral diplomacies of the United States after the 1960s: the USFK reduction plan, 
conflicts in the Pueblo case, and the Nixon Doctrine. Scholars including Su Hyong Lee, 
as presented by Kyung Soo Lee, state that “a fundamental framework of Korean security 
policies is the ROK–U.S. alliance, and the self-reliance defense policy [in both regimes] 
                                                 
58 Lee, 63. 
59 Soo Hyong Lee, “Restructuring Arrangements of the ROK-U.S. Security System,” (author’s 
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is a result of self-help efforts to overcome the alliance security dilemma in the 
asymmetric alliance.”60 In this sense, Noh Soon Chang and Dong Joon Jo also assert that 
the alliance security dilemma has a direct impact on self-reliance defense policies.61 
In a slightly different view, Chul Ho Cho compares the two governments’ 
policies. Cho holds that Park and Roh’s self-defense policies showed great differences in 
terms of U.S. support and the role of the ROK–U.S. alliance.62 Cho argues that Park’s 
policy direction was closer to an independent defense, while Roh tended to be 
cooperative with the U.S.63  
While existing research on Park’s self-reliance policy focuses on security issues, 
previous discussions on Roh’s policy argue that a changed security identity, weakened 
threat perception toward the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), and 
reinforced military capabilities led South Korea to try to gain independent deterrent 
power. In particular, Hyun Soo Kim argues that “conflicts of identity that share a threat 
were formed and predicted changes in alliance relations, leading to the self-defense 
policy to get autonomy [in the Roh administration].”64 In a different context, Young Ho 
Kim and Sun Won Park argue that Roh’s self-reliance policy was an attempt not to 
                                                 
60 In his doctoral dissertation, Lee concludes that besides the security issues, “the philosophy and 
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construct independent military deterrence that completely excluded the ROK–U.S. 
alliance, but to establish a symmetrical alliance with the United States.65 As for a concept 
of ‘independence’ in the Roh government’s defense policy, there is controversy between 
schools. Thus, more investigation is needed in this thesis. 
Taken together, the background and causes for each government’s decision on 
military aid for the United States can be divided into two broad categories. First is the 
idea that as a result of the asymmetric alliance dilemma, South Korea supported 
American wars to ensure its own security and manage the security dilemma within an 
asymmetric alliance. Second is the argument that economic compensation through 
military support was the main cause of the dispatch of troops.  
Initially, citing Princeton Lyman’s argument, Dong Ju Choi claims that South 
Korea decided to dispatch its troops to Vietnam to ensure its security on the Korean 
peninsula.66 Tae Il Chung claims that Roh’s government used the dispatch to overcome 
limitations of coordination with the United States in resolving the North Korean nuclear 
crisis.67 Chung further argues that the Korean administration sent troops to prevent the 
strategic flexibility of the USFK and enhance Korea’s strategic value.68 President Roh 
Moo-Hyun’s remarks, which emphasized that dispatching troops was to fulfill the duty of 
the alliance and resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis peacefully, can also be put in the 
same context. Overall discussions are linked to security issues coming from the fear of 
abandonment and entrapment.  
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In a different approach, Kwan-Ok Kim analyzes the South Korean dispatch 
diplomacy through Putnam’s “two level game theory.” 69 According to Kim, Korea’s 
absolute security dependence on the U.S. led to the decision to dispatch its troops to 
Vietnam.70 Moreover, in the case of sending troops to Iraq, Kim asserts, in common with 
Hun Jang, that the diversification of domestic political systems and the weakening of 
security dependence on the U.S. made it more difficult to dispatch troops.71 From a 
different view, Tae Gyun Park asserts that the Park Jung Hee regime decided to send its 
troops to Vietnam to block the USFK withdrawal.72 Park points out that the fundamental 
reason for the Korean government to dispatch troops to the Vietnam War was to fill the 
security gap on the Korean peninsula.73 Hence, security dependence on the United States 
is one of the reasons for the two governments’ dispatch policies. 
On the other hand, Dong Ju Choi, citing Kyu Dok Hong’s dissertation, argues that 
the Korean government deployed soldiers mainly for economic benefits.74 Choi writes 
that the regime, “who knew better than the fact that the Korean War provided a decisive 
opportunity for Japan’s economic growth, was unlikely to dispatch the troops to Vietnam 
without economic motivation.” 75  In addition, Choi mentions that as a typical 
                                                 
69 Putnam argued that the “win-sets” of the nation is determined through the interaction of domestic 
political institutions and international relations, which reflects to the foreign policy of the state. Based on 
this, Kim analyzes what determined Korea’s dispatch diplomacies based on these hypotheses. Robert D. 
Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two Level Games,” International Organization 
42, no.3 (Summer 1988), 435–437, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706785. 
70 Kwan Ok Kim, “An Analysis of Dispatch Diplomacy of the Korean Troops from the Two-Level 
Approach: A Comparative Analysis of Dispatching Policies of the Korean Troops toward Vietnam and 
Iraq,” (author’s translation) Korean Journal of Political Science 13, no.1 (March 2005): 359–371, 
http://kiss.kstudy.com/journal/thesis_name.asp?tname=kiss2002&key=2452506. 
71 Kim, “An Analysis of Dispatch Diplomacy of the Korean Troops from the Two-Level Approach,” 
379; Hun Jang, “An Analysis of the Decision Making Process of Sending Troops to Iraq (2003~2004): 
Changing Roles of the President, the Parliament and Civil Society,” Dispute Resolution Studies Review 13, 
no.2 (2015): 129, doi: 10.16958/drsr.2015.13.2.105. 
72 Tae Gyun Park, “Between Memory and Oblivion: The Dispatch of Korean Combat Troops to 
Vietnam,” (author’s translation) Critical Review of History 80 (August 2007): 292, http://www.dbpia.co.kr/
Article/NODE00873704. 
73 Tae Gyun Park, “Between Memory and Oblivion,” 292. 
74 Kyu Dok Hong, “Unequal Partners: ROK-US Relations During the Vietnam War,” (Ph. D 
dissertation, University of South Carolina, 1991), quoted in Dong-Ju Choi, “Impact of the Vietnam-
Dispatch upon Korean Economic Industrialization,” (author’s translation) Southeast Asian Studies 11 
(March 2011): 205–206, http://dlps.nanet.go.kr/DlibViewer.do?cn=KINX2001049808&sysid=nhn. 
75 Choi, “Impact of the Vietnam-Dispatch upon Korean Economic Industrialization,” 205–206.  
20 
developmental state, Korea decided to send its troops to Vietnam absolutely for economic 
growth. 76  As Tae-ho Kang argues, existing research dealing with this economic 
motivation say that “removing the fear of collapse of the Korean financial market in 
response to the North Korean bombing [by the U.S.]” was a major factor of the decision 
to deploy soldiers to Iraq.77 In addition to Kang’s comments, Bo Hyuk Suh argues that 
the economic benefits that could be gained “through participation in postwar Iraq 
reconstruction projects” were one of the decisive factors behind sending troops to Iraq.78 
Unlike the aforementioned research, though, some scholars like Se Jin Kim and Heon 
Chul Kwon argue that the economic benefits were merely the results of participation in 
both wars, not a fundamental reason. 79  Consequently, another school insists that 
economic growth and stability were driving factors for the two governments to deploy 
soldiers to the wars. 
Despite contradictions of alliance policies within each government, the fact that 
scholars recognized the two policies as individual phenomena, and that no research was 
done to define the correlation, can be taken as a limitation of existing research. Although 
some studies explore a causal relationship between the Korean government’s threat 
perception and self-defense policies, and there exist comparative studies of the Roh Moo 
Hyun and Park Jung Hee governments on self-defense policies based on security identity 
and threat recognition, existing studies overlook the contradiction between the two 
policies. 
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D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
This literature review suggests that 
• The assessment of Korea’s diplomatic autonomy within its asymmetric 
alliance is too limited. 
• No previous studies take an analytical approach to the contradiction of 
foreign policies within each government. 
• When a North Korean threat appeared that the ROK could not afford to 
control, South Korea always wanted to utilize the ROK–U.S. alliance.  
In addition to these findings, assuming that the alliance dilemma is an apparatus 
to optimize the alliance’s performance by restricting a small state’s action, if the weaker 
country is not constrained by the policies and strategies of the great powers, alliance 
performance could be degraded. Put differently, without the common threat perception 
crucial to forming an alliance, inconsistent alliance policies could occur. 
Based on these findings, this thesis makes the following hypotheses:  
First, if its threat perception falls either below the common threat or above the 
level of an existential threat, the ROK will take action to show or withdraw its 
commitment in response to a relatively small increase of the threat recognition. Thus, an 
unpredictable security threat could have been a critical factor that put Roh Moo Hyun’s 
administration back into the framework of the ROK–U.S. alliance, since his government 
had very different threat perception than that of the United States. 
Second, if South Korea faces an existential threat, it tends to pursue an 
independent defense policy, since it doubts the U.S. willingness to protect it. Hence, the 
Park Jung Hee administration tended to break away from the alliance mechanism and 
seek other means to guarantee its national security.  
The thesis begins with the assumption that although U.S. foreign policy in the 
ROK–U.S. alliance can be divided into hard and soft lines, its threat perception is 
relatively stable. Analyzing the U.S. National Security Strategy published from 1987 to 
2006, the United States recognizes North Korea as a significant threat to security on the 
Korean peninsula, and it consistently states that the ROK–U.S. alliance should deter 
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North Korea through the robust presence of U.S. forces. 80  The National Military 
Strategies published between 1992 and 2004 also describe North Korea and the North 
Korean nuclear program as immediate threats to U.S. Asian allies. 81 Furthermore, a 
Gallup survey shows that since 2000, Americans have recognized North Korea as the 
U.S. greatest enemy, and the trend is unchanged. 82  As a whole, the United States 
essentially defines North Korea as a dangerous enemy, and this is quite different from 
Korea, which sometimes takes a favorable position toward North Korea. In this regard, 
the thesis presumes that the U.S. maintains a consistent perception of the North Korean 
threat and the security situation on the Korean peninsula. 
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E. RESEARCH DESIGN  
In this thesis, the independent variable (IV) is the threat perception of South 
Korea, and the dependent variable (DV) is contradiction in alliance policies, redefined as 
the alliance’s cohesion. This thesis will undertake a comparative case study of the 
apparently reverse changes in alliance policies between the Roh Moo Hyun and Park 
Jung Hee administrations.  
The research will examine the presidents’ memoirs, press interviews, and policy 
analysis of major issues in order to analyze the threat recognition of the two 
governments. In addition, to investigate the correlation between the self-reliant defense 
policy and dispatch of troops, this thesis pays attention to diplomatic documents and 
existing scholars’ analyses. Above all, by paying attention to the emergence of threats 
and the timing of policy announcements, a particular pattern might be discovered.  
To compare each government, the thesis utilizes the Yerkes–Dodson Law 
(Inverted U model).83 The theory suggests that individual stress and performance have an 
inverted U-type correlation. In political economy, the inverted-U model is frequently 
used to analyze the relationship between competition and innovation. Given that the two 
terms are respectively fitted to pressure and performance, the model is worthy of use in 
deriving the relationship between threat perception and alliance cohesion between the 
ROK–U.S. alliance. Figure 1 shows a visualized reference to the Yerkes-Dodson Law. 
                                                 
83 Defining the Yerkes-DODson Law, Elizabeth Duffy states that “In general, the optimal degree of 
activation appears to be a moderate one, the curve which expresses the relationship between [arousal] and 
quality of performance taking the form of an inverted U.” Elizabeth Duffy, “The Psychological 
Significance of the Concept of ‘Arousal’ Or ‘Activation,’” Psychological Review 64, no. 5 (September 
1957): 268, doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/h0048837; According to Francesca Gino, the Yerkes-DODson 
law explains that “performance increases with physiological or mental arousal (stress) but only up to a 
point. When the level of stress becomes too high, performance decreases.” Francesca Gino, “Are You Too 
Stressed to Be Productive? Or Not Stressed Enough?” Harvard Business Review, last modified April 14, 
2016, https://hbr.org/2016/04/are-you-too-stressed-to-be-productive-or-not-stressed-enough. 
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Figure 1.  The ROK–U.S. Alliance Analysis Tool 
 
As emphasized earlier, this thesis assumes that U.S. threat perception is relatively 
constant. Furthermore, the thesis defines a common threat as a threat shared between 
South Korea and the United States about security circumstances in North Korea and 
outside of the Korean peninsula. Taking into account that consistent and strong alliance 
policies are possible when South Korea and the United States share threat perception, 
common threat perception, which can lead to optimum alliance performance, can be 
prompted by mid-level pressure. The model can be useful for analyzing the correlation 
between South Korea’s threat perception and ROK–U.S. alliance cohesion. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis is divided into four chapters. Chapters II and III will discuss how the 
Roh and Park administrations’ threat perceptions changed, respectively, in response to 
domestic and international factors. Chapter IV discusses implications for South Korea 
and limitations of the thesis, and suggests research directions that can complement the 






II. THREAT PERCEPTION IN THE ROH MOO HYUN 
ADMINISTRATION AND THE ROK–U.S. ALLIANCE COHESION 
The Roh Moo Hyun government took over the Sunshine Policy of its predecessor 
administration and treated North Korea with brotherhood. Unlike past South Korean 
governments, which traditionally regarded North Korea’s military power as a means of a 
southward invasion or hostile intention, Roh acknowledged and tolerated North Korea’s 
military threat as rights of self-defense. South Korea’s low threat awareness led to 
contradictory alliance policies: a self-reliance defense policy alongside deployment of 
troops to Iraq. Above all, this resulted in considerable alliance conflicts with the Bush 
administration during President Roh’s presidency. This chapter will examine the Roh 
Moo Hyun government’s threat perception regarding North Korea and the security 
environment surrounding the Korean peninsula. Furthermore, the chapter will investigate 
how South Korean threat perception can impact the ROK–U.S. alliance’s cohesion. In 
exploring the consistency of Korea’s alliance policies, this chapter will find a significant 
connection between the Korean government’s perceived threat to its security environment 
and the ROK–U.S. alliance’s solidarity. First, the thesis explores the Roh 
administration’s self-reliance defense policy and dispatch of troops to Iraq.  
A. SELF-RELIANCE DEFENSE POLICY 
President Roh Moo Hyun’s willingness for South Korea’s self-defense was 
revealed through his presidential election campaign. According to the 16th Presidential 
Election Pledge, Roh aimed to reinforce Korea’s advanced self-defense system by 
transforming South Korean forces from a troop-intensive force to a technology-intensive 
military, establishing an independent defense posture by increasing its defense budget.84 
More than anything else, his belief in self-defense initiated the transfer of wartime 
operational control (OPCON) in the Korean peninsula from the United States to South 
Korea. As Kyung Soo Lee illustrates, President Roh, in the most significant step of 
                                                 
84 “16Dae Daesungongyak – Kungbangbunya,” 16대 대선공약- 국방분야 [The 16th Presidential 
Election Pledge – National Defense Field] (author’s translation) Policy Department, last updated December 
20, 2012, http://knowhow.pa.go.kr/roh/vision_1/policy/view.asp?bid=3&pid=181&cp=1&num=15. 
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implementing his self-reliance defense policy, constantly questioned the OPCON 
handover, which the commander of the United States Forces of Korea (USFK) exercised, 
from his days in the 2002 presidential election.85 Taken together, three factors can define 
the Roh Moo Hyun regime’s self-defense policy: the OPCON transfer, military reform 
and defense budget increase. 
1. The Transfer of Wartime Operation Control  
In general, self-reliance in national defense implies that a country has the 
capabilities to conduct its own military operations. South Korea’s OPCON, which it 
conceded to the U.S. after the Korean War in 1950, has to date been delegated to the 
USFK commander. As Young Ho Kim puts it, Roh Moo Hyun had issues with the fact 
that as supreme commander of the armed forces of South Korea, he could not employ the 
authority of operational command in wartime on the Korean peninsula.86 In a sense, the 
transfer of OPCON was closely related to the military sovereignty of South Korea.  
The OPCON transfer was discussed officially within the ROK–U.S. alliance when 
Presidents George W. Bush and Roh Moo Hyun agreed on its principles at the ROK–U.S. 
summit on September 16, 2006. However, as Jong Seok Lee describes, Roh instructed the 
Ministry of National Defense to prepare a blueprint for independent national defense with 
the promise of the OPCON transfer as soon as he took office in 2003.87 Roh strongly 
insisted on the OPCON transfer despite intense opposition within Korean military and 
political circles. According to Jong Seok Lee’s memoir, since “independent national 
defense means equipping with the ability to carry out ones own war, and this can be done 
only by possessing operational planning and operation capability, the OPCON transfer 
became a prerequisite for the nation’s self-defense.”88 The expected effect of the OPCON 
                                                 
85 Kyung Soo Lee, “A Comparative Study on ‘Self-Reliant Defence’ Policy of Park & Rho’s 
Regimes,” 152. 
86 Young Ho Kim, “Hyuprukjeock Jajugukbangua Han∙Mi Dongmaeng” 협력적 자주국방과 
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87 Jong Seok Lee, Kalnal wieui Pyunghwa 칼날위의 평화 [Peace on the Blade] (author’s translation) 
(Gyeonggi Province: Kaemagowon, 2014), 81. Jong Seok Lee participated in the Commission on the 16th 
Presidential Transition and set up a strategic underpinning for President Roh Moo Hyun’s national defense 
as well as foreign policies, and completed the South Korean National Security Council (NSC) system. 
88 Jong Seok Lee, Kalnal wieui Pyunghwa 칼날위의 평화 [Peace on the Blade], 80.  
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transfer would be to dismantle the ROK–U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC). It 
essentially implied forming a new military cooperation system led by the ROK military 
and supported by the U.S. military. Figure 2 illustrates the situation before and after 
OPCON transfer. More specifically, it illustrates that the USFK’s commander led all 
military operations in the Korean peninsula before the transfer, but that the ROK Joint 
Chiefs of Staff commander took over the primary leadership role after.  
Figure 2.  Comparison of before and after the OPCON Transfer89  
 
One can interpret the dismantlement of the CFC, which symbolized the ROK–
U.S. alliance, as the withdrawal of the USFK and furthermore the dissolution of the 
ROK–U.S. alliance. As a result, the President’s initiative conflicted with not only the 
Blue House but also top military commanders. For example, as Jong Seok Lee describes, 
on January 16, 2003, the Ministry of Defense ruled out the term “self-defense” in the 
agency report, which was delivered to the Commission of the Presidential Transition.90 
Lee further mentions that on May 6, 2003, while reporting on its vision of self-defense to 
President Roh, the Ministry of Defense did not even mention wartime operational 
                                                 
89 Source: Hyung Joon (Joshua) Byun, “Explaining South Korean Policy Toward the United States, 
1987–2014,” E-International Relations Students, last updated July 12, 2015, http://www.e-ir.info/2015/07/
12/explaining-south-korean-policy-toward-the-united-states-1987-2014/. 
90 Jong Seok Lee, Kalnal wieui Pyunghwa 칼날위의 평화 [Peace on the Blade], 81. 
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control.91 This led to continuing conflicts between President Roh and decision-makers in 
Korea’s national defense policy.  
However, the objective security situation both at home and abroad made President 
Roh confident about the OPCON transfer. These included South Korea’s overwhelming 
economic power, its military spending, and intimate diplomatic relations with China. As 
a result, as Jong Seok Lee recalls, the Roh government, through the establishment of the 
Korean National Security Council (NSC), drove a strong reform effort toward self-
defense represented by the return of OPCON. 92 President Roh emphasized that self-
reliance defense was compatible with the ROK–U.S. alliance and that the OPCON 
transfer did not constitute a demand for the USFK withdrawal. However, as described by 
Sang Hun Choe, inconsistency within Roh’s remarks, such as “What’s wrong with being 
anti-American?,” and the actual alliance policies of the government caused security 
anxiety in South Korea.93 This political stance led to an ongoing struggle with the United 
States and further amplified South Korean security concerns over North Korea’s military 
threats. In a sense, the OPCON transfer issue counterbalanced South Korea’s objective 
power superiority over North Korea in terms of politics, economy and diplomacy. 
2. Defense Budget Increase 
The Roh Moo Hyun administration in its early stages wanted to secure deterrence 
capabilities against the North Korean threat and desired progress toward an independent 
defense policy. In particular, the Korean government set a goal of securing sufficient 
military capabilities to deter North Korea by 2010 by replacing much of its reliance on 
the United States with South Korean military power. The work of the National Security 
Council, cited by Hyun Soo Kim, illustrates that the Roh administration, in its March 4, 
2004, National Security Initiative, emphasized the necessity of securing independent 
surveillance and reconnaissance means at an early stage and increasing Korea’s defense 
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spending to boost the ROK military’s preparedness for the future.94 To achieve this goal, 
according to Jong Seok Lee, the ROK Ministry of Defense demanded the government 
spend about 3.2% of the annual GDP on defense.95 As Lee further puts it, at that time, the 
government was allocating a great deal of money for the overall welfare of the people, so 
it was impossible to increase the defense budget, but President Roh Moo Hyun reduced 
the budgets of other departments and increased defense expenditures to more than 8% in 
2004 and 2008; astonishingly, this was the largest increase in the Korean defense budget 
since the 1980s.96 Figure 3 shows this trend of increases in defense expenditures before 
and after the Roh Moo Hyun administration. 
Figure 3.   National Defense Budget Progress, Compared to Previous Year97  
 
 
Particularly, in order to equip Korea’s information and reconnaissance assets and 
precision strike system, in which areas the ROK had highly depended upon the U.S. in 
military operations on the Korean peninsula, the Roh administration demanded 
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astronomical resources. According to Sung Jin Park, the Defense Research Institute 
expressed considerable concern that the Korean government’s acquisition of new weapon 
systems could lead to massive purchases of arms from the U.S.98 However, as Hyun Soo 
Kim argues, Roh made considerable efforts to secure the ROK’s military forces to carry 
out his own operations with a long-term perspective.99 These efforts increased the overall 
national defense budget. 
3. Military Reform: Defense Reform 2020 
Apart from the expansion of the defense budget, the Roh administration worked 
out a roadmap for reforming the ROK’s military structure. According to the National 
Defense Reform Act passed on December 28, 2006, the Ministry of Defense aimed to 
gradually reduce the standing army by securing the cutting-edge power of the ROK 
Army, Navy and Air Force, ultimately to “convert the troop-intensive quantitative 
military structure into the technology-intensive military structure based on information 
and knowledge.” 100  The so-called Korea Ministry of National Defense’s “Defense 
Reform 2020” envisioned the construction of self-reliance military forces within a 
security environment in which the ROK–U.S. alliance had shifted because of issues such 
as the gradual reduction of the USFK and the transition of wartime operational control.101 
Defense Reform 2020, as elaborated by the ROK Ministry of National Defense, 
consisted of several actions to upgrade Korean military forces. Structurally, the 
Department of Defense planned to dismantle field army commands, integrate them as a 
ground operation command, and convert the ROK Army to a maneuvering infantry 
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system.102 In addition, according to the Defense Reform plan, the department set up a 
plan for the ROK Air Force that replaced 500 mid-low class fighters with 420 high-low 
aircraft, including the F-15K and FX, and secured air superiority with the ROKAF for a 
potential war in the Korean peninsula. 103  Similarly, the plan emphasizes that the 
department shifted the ROK’s Navy to a structure suitable for a three-dimensional 
operation simultaneously on sea, land, and air.104 More importantly, as Defense Reform 
2020 illustrates, the Roh government gradually tried to expand its civilian control in the 
Ministry of Defense and to improve the efficiency of weapons acquisition and operation 
through the establishment of the Defense Acquisition Program Administration 
(DAPA). 105 Taken together, the Roh Moo Hyun administration tried to regain some 
measure of the military sovereignty that was handed over to the ROK–U.S. alliance 
through the transfer of wartime operational control. Above all, the ROK government 
strived to reform military structures and procure defense spending to a considerable 
extent in order to achieve self-defense. Roh’s independent defense policy continued 
throughout his tenure (2003-2007), and he established an institutional framework that the 
next regime could follow through various laws and regulations. 
B.  DISPATCH OF TROOPS FOR THE IRAQ WAR 
The dispatch of troops to Iraq ran counter to the Roh Moo Hyun government’s 
self-defense doctrine highlighted in the previous section. This is because dispatching 
troops generally represents the highest level of defense commitment to one’s ally. 
President Roh sent troops to Iraq two times. As Kwan Ok Kim notes, “South Korea 
received a request from the United States for [military] assistance on November 20, 2002, 
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four months before the United States attacked Iraq.”106 One cannot judge South Korea’s 
first dispatch to Iraq in March 2003 as an independent political decision on the part of the 
Roh administration, because it was conducted during the transition period between the 
Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun governments. Therefore, this section focuses on the 
second additional dispatch.  
1. The Additional Dispatch to the Iraq War  
On December 17, 2003, as Samuel Len describes, the Roh administration decided 
to dispatch the Zaytun Division, which was approximately 3000 composite soldiers, to 
the Iraqi Arbil region.107 As Kwan Ok Kim argues, “the United States declared the end of 
the war on May 1, 2003, but as the security situation in Iraq became unstable due to 
continued terrorism even under U.S. military occupation, allies’ military support became 
more and more necessary.”108 Particularly, as Tae Il Chung describes, since the U.S. 
independently conducted the war in Iraq despite the United Nations’ opposition, the U.S. 
government faced a considerable financial burden. 109  Chung further mentions that 
although some countries in Asia and Eastern Europe, including Japan, pledged their 
military support for the United States, they were not ideally suited for U.S. military 
operations in Iraq; not only were they unable to provide enough military forces to the 
U.S., but they had also established political and economic interests in Iraq before the 
conflict.110 Therefore, South Korea’s additional dispatch enabled the U.S. not only to 
justify its cause for the Iraq War but also to reduce its military burden. 
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On the other hand, the Roh government conflicted considerably with the Bush 
administration of the United States over the scale and timing of the dispatch. As Sun Won 
Park argues, from September 2003 to early 2004, “since the ROK and U.S. had to deal 
with the three core agendas: dispatching troops to Iraq, the reduction of the USFK and the 
resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue simultaneously, the tension between policy 
decision making groups became high.”111 In particular, the two countries’ positions on 
the size of the dispatch greatly differed. Per Jong Seok Lee’s memoir, on September 4, 
2003, the U.S. officially requested the dispatch of division-sized combat troops, between 
3000 to 5000 soldiers, through Assistant Secretary Richard Rollis. 112  Lee further 
mentions that “the U.S. hoped that South Korea would send as many troops as possible 
[as soon as practical].”113 This put political pressure on the Korean government to send 
sizable combat forces.  
However, since the international community did not recognize the Iraq War as 
just, the South Korean government felt a considerable political burden about the large-
scale deployment of combat troops to Iraq. For example, Lee recollects that “while the 
United States expected South Korea to dispatch its division headquarters and two or three 
infantry brigades [to carry out local combat against terrorists], South Korea wanted to 
send just one or two brigades [composed of between 2000 to 3000 soldiers] to conduct 
local stabilization operations.”114 In addition, as Lee further states, since the national 
schism surrounding the dispatch, as well as negative Korean public opinion on the 
deployment of troops to Iraq, were both severe, President Roh “stressed that [Korea] 
should have enough time to review the decision of deploying troops.”115 In this vein, one 
can say that the Korean government’s decision to dispatch its troops to the Iraq War was 
carried out under considerable pressure. 
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Ultimately, as Lee describes, the decision to send troops to Iraq on December 17, 
2003 was finalized based on the following instructions from President Roh Moo Hyun: 
• Do not exceed 3,000 soldiers with regard to the additional dispatched 
military units. 
• Prepare two plans in the Ministry of National Defense: 
1. Local management plan 
2. Reconstruction support-oriented plan 
- Review advantages and disadvantages of the above 
measures.  
• If Korea is in charge of an area, let the Iraqi military and police 
organizations take charge of security. Review ways to train the Iraqi 
military. 
• If Korea is in charge of an area, try to find an operation area where we can 
flexibly perform security and reconstruction support functions while 
avoiding large areas and important and dangerous areas (avoid big cities 
like Mosul). 
   - Discuss organizing the headquarters on a small scale. 
• Establish independent armies separate from other countries’ army units as 
the Ministry of National Defense estimates.116 
As seen in these details, the South Korean government approached the 
deployment of its additional military units in attempts to avoid further diplomatic friction 
with the United States and to accept the domestic public opinion against the war. 
Interestingly, as Sun Won Park puts it, the Roh government agreed to extend the dispatch 
twice during his tenure, and South Korea consented to withdraw the Zaytun Unit in 
phases and station it in Arbil by the end of 2008. 117  On the whole, the Roh 
administration’s aggressive military support for the U.S. contradicted his self-reliance 
defense.  
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C. THE ROH ADMINISTRATION’S THREAT PERCEPTION 
Applying the first hypothesis set out in this thesis, the low threat perception of the 
South Korean government can be found at the base of its inconsistent alliance policies, as 
manifested through its self-defense and dispatch policies. Yet U.S. apparent consideration 
of war with North Korea increased the Roh administration’s anxiety. This then raised its 
threat perception, and South Korea took further actions to reinforce the alliance. To 
explore this dynamic further, this section first examines the political position of the Roh 
administration on North Korea. Then, the section investigates the causes of the Roh 
administration’s “threat deflation”118 by exploring the political philosophy of the leader 
and the composition of the administration, which directly affected the government’s 
foreign policy. More important, it infers the Korean government’s diplomatic 
preferences. 
1. President Roh’s Position toward North Korea 
The Roh administration’s stance on North Korea aligned with the preceding 
administration’s Sunshine Policy. The 2004 Unification White Paper of South Korea 
encapsulates the policy as “peace on the Korean peninsula” and the “common prosperity 
of North and South Koreas.”119 More importantly, the South Korean government gave 
shape to its roadmap toward becoming a center of Northeast Asian prosperity based on 
the unification of the Peninsula. Also, as the White Paper illustrates, the Roh 
administration presented four principles to achieve its policy goals:  
1. all issues should be resolved through dialogue;  
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2. priority should be placed on building mutual trust and “upholding 
reciprocity”;  
3. inter-Korean issues should be resolved by South and North Korea in 
cooperation with the international community; and,  
4. Seoul will strive to ensure transparency, expand citizen participation, and 
secure “bipartisan support” in implementing North Korea policy.120  
As a whole, the Roh Moo Hyun government’s policy toward North Korea 
ultimately aimed at achieving permanent peace on the Korean peninsula based on 
peaceful coexistence and reconciliation between the two Koreas, away from consumptive 
ideological conflicts and confrontations in the past. As Hak Nam Kim puts it, at that time, 
the South Korean government was focused on “reconciliation through economic 
cooperation” with North Korea. 121  In addition, the White Paper on Unification was 
issued in February 2004, after North Korea had already withdrawn from Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the North Korean nuclear crisis was on the rise. This 
meant, as seen in the President’s remarks described by Choong Nam Kim, that the Roh 
administration prioritized a favorable relationship with North Korea over any other 
foreign policy, including the ROK–U.S. alliance. 122  Taken together, it could be 
speculated that President Roh’s policy viewed North Korea as a partner of his initiative 
toward Northeast Asian peace. 
The President’s remarks concretely revealed this diplomatic stance toward North 
Korea. On January 24, 2003, in an interview with Mike Chinoy123 after the North Korean 
NPT withdrawal, Roh stated, “I think the best means of peaceful solution is dialogue, 
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rather than unilaterally demanding North Korea to abandon its nuclear ambition…[the 
North Korean nuclear program is] a political card to secure their political regime and to 
secure economic assistance for implementing reforms and opening up.”124 Similarly, in a 
November 12, 2004 speech to the World Affairs Council (WAC) in Los Angeles, Roh 
proclaimed that “There was some validity to North Korea’s position that its nuclear and 
missile programs were intended to deter outside threats.”125 However, Roh’s remarks 
radically leaned towards supporting North Korea in a meeting with Koreans in Mongolia: 
“Fundamental legitimacy issues, not making concessions on these matters, I would like to 
give institutional and material support [to North Korea] without conditions…I am fully 
open to North Korea. Let’s talk about anything at anytime and anywhere.” 126  Such 
statements by Roh demonstrate that during his presidency, the South Korean government 
perceived the North Korean threat as a trivial one.  
Even during his state visit to Australia in December 7, 2006, after the first nuclear 
test by North Korea, Roh’s statement remained exactly in this same line. According to 
Chosunilbo, President Roh said, “even though North Korea has nuclear weapons, ‘South 
Korea’s military is maintaining a superior weight against the North...What’s more, it’s 
impossible for Pyongyang to conquer and the idea of its ruling is even more 
impossible.’”127 In short, during the presidency of Roh Moo Hyun, South Korea inherited 
the Sunshine Policy from the preceding Kim Dae Jung regime. One can say that it 
employed an active engagement policy toward North Korea, based on a significantly low 
threat perception of North Korea. 
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2. Root Causes of the Roh Administration’s Low Threat Perception 
Why did the Roh government’s perception of the North Korean threat 
significantly decrease? A change in the perception of the other party in international 
relations can lead to a change in the foreign policies of a country. As Robert Putnam puts 
it, a foreign policy is a result of the interaction of the domestic politics of a country and 
the international environment. 128  While the international environment as a structural 
factor is difficult to change, domestic politics can be influenced by various factors. 
Domestic political conditions were a driving factor behind the Roh administration’s 
international relations. 
a. Political Philosophy of President Roh Moo Hyun 
President Roh Moo Hyun was one of the most progressive politicians in South 
Korea. As described by Nam Chin Heo, the fact that he rejected the imperial presidential 
model of South Korea and adhered to the principle of separation of party and politics, the 
decentralization of political power, indicates this quite well.129 According to Yong Hee 
Yoon’s analysis, prior to joining the political world, Roh’s career as a human rights 
lawyer from a poor peasant family, representing the interests of ordinary people, naturally 
led to his progressive political tendencies.130 In practice, based on Roh Moo Hyun’s 
memoir, from his presidential election until his retirement, his primary political objective 
was to establish peace through dialogue and compromise in both domestic politics and 
diplomacy. 131 To be more specific, President Roh aimed at ending the confrontation 
between right and left ideologies and regional factionalism, which traditionally 
dominated South Korean politics. Above all, as Hyun Soo Kim argues, Roh was eager to 
get Korean politics “to accept the change of the security environment through fighting off 
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the existing [excessive] anti-communism culture.”132 Evidently, Roh perceived that deep-
rooted ideological controversy was a fundamental obstacle to progress in South Korean 
politics. 
His attempt to abolish the National Security Law and the elimination of the 
concept of “primary enemy” showed Roh Moo Hyun’s political philosophy of ending 
ideological confrontation in Korean politics. To begin with, as Hyun Soo Kim explains, 
the term “primary enemy” was first used in 1988 by the ROK Ministry of Defense.133 
Kim further mentions that it was then changed in 1994 to “neighboring potential 
adversary” under the new military strategy of the Roh Tae Woo regime.”134 However, as 
Kim puts it, in the book Peace, Prosperity and National Security of the Roh Moo Hyun 
administration, published on March 4, 2004, North Korea was not portrayed as the main 
enemy, but, rather, the term was replaced by “North Korea’s military threat.”135 Roh 
Moo Hyun’s tenure was a period during which antagonistic emotion against North Korea 
considerably weakened, influenced by the improvement of inter-Korean relations in the 
previous Kim Dae Jung administration and following the end of the Cold War. However, 
the removal of the concept ‘main enemy’ caused a great shock in Korean political circles 
and significant controversy over the political identity of the Roh government. President 
Roh’s strong will to end the ideological controversy appeared particularly prominently in 
the defense and security arenas. 
In the same vein, in late 2004 the Roh administration tried to abolish the National 
Security Law, which had strongly influenced the build-up of hostility against North 
Korea. As Diane Kraft argues, the Security Law “had been enacted in 1948 in response to 
threats from communist North Korea.”136 Kraft further mentions that its primary purpose 
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was “to prevent anti-state acts from threatening the security of South Korea.” 137 
However, per Kraft’s argument, not only had the law degenerated as a political tool for 
suppressing democratization and student movements during the military regimes from 
1961–1992, but South Korea’s threat perception toward North Korea had also changed, 
as the reconciliation mood characterizing inter-Korean relations posed considerable doubt 
about the rationale of its presence.138 As Kraft notes, in an interview with announcer Ki 
Young Eum of Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation (MBC) in Sisa Magazine 2580, a 
Korean current affairs program, on September 5, 2004, President Roh said, “It [the law] 
would be better sent to the museum sealed.”139 More than anything else, as described by 
Hyun Soo Kim, through the effort to eradicate the National Security Law, President Roh 
showed that “[he] was aware of North Korea as a partner to cooperate for peaceful 
unification, being away from the perception of the anti-state group that prevailed in the 
Cold War period.”140 Thus, Roh tried to eliminate ideological conflicts in Korean society 
through these two institutional reforms.  
Overall, President Roh Moo Hyun’s political philosophy was to break away from 
the ideological confrontation of a divided nation, and eventually to attain peaceful 
coexistence and harmony with North Korea. However, amid increasing North Korean 
military threats, his persistent political convictions caused considerable conflicts among 
South Korean political parties. South Korean threat perception, which remained at a fairly 
low level during the Roh administration, served to weaken the strength of the ROK–U.S. 
alliance, the main security mechanism responding to North Korea. 
b. Composition of Bureaucrats in the Roh Administration: 386 Generation 
In addition to Roh Moo Hyun’s governing ideology, Roh’s government 
bureaucrats also played a decisive role in lowering threat awareness about North Korea. 
As Il Pyong Kim addresses, President Roh “drew many of his first and second cabinet 
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members from a younger generation of administrators.”141 He further mentions that as 
the so-called “386 Generation” played a central role in the Blue House and cabinet, 
“some observers fear[ed] that Mr. Roh’s government [was] moving too fast toward left-
wing socialism.”142 Above all, as Jong Ryn Mo argues, since most of this generation had 
a more pro-North Korean mindset, it can be inferred that Roh Moo Hyun government’s 
way of thinking about North Korea was considerably influenced by them.143 Because of 
this structure, as Ho Keun Song notes, the Roh’s administration was generally called a 
“386 regime.”144 
Indeed, the 386 generation played a locomotive-like role in Roh Moo Hyun’s 
victory in the 16th presidential election. As a result, per Hayam Kim and Uk Heo, these 
young politicians were introduced to South Korean politics as new political forces.145 As 
Kim and Heo’s describe, the 386 generation means:  
the group of people who were in their 30s in the 1990s, went to 
universities in the 1980s, and were born in the 1960s. While this 
generation was in college, the democracy activist movement was most 
intense, eventually leading to the transition to democracy ...Many of the 
386-generation democracy activists successfully entered the political arena 
as legislators, party leaders, lawyers, judges, policy makers, and 
government officials, bring about different [more or less radical] 
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perspectives in politics, including [relationship with North Korea and] 
South Korea-U.S. relations.146 
Above all, this 386 generation was speculated to assist President Roh Moo Hyun 
closely and drive many changes in his ideology and policies. Jong Ryn Mo argues that:  
the rise of the 386 generation meant a shift in ruling ideology [of the 
Roh’s regime]. The leaders of the 386 generation, the 386 politicians, can 
be best described as left-wing nationalists. Nationalism and socialism were 
the two leading ideologies of the student movement of the 1980s when 
most of the 386 politicians started their political careers. They 
were…naturally attracted to opposite political values, anti-Americanism, 
pro-North Korean nationalism, and progressivism.147 
Consequently, the political and administrative bureaucratic systems of the Roh 
Moo Hyun government, which consisted mainly of the 386 generation, contributed to that 
government’s continued engagement policy toward North Korea. The Roh Moo Hyun 
regime’s devaluation of North Korean military threats, including its nuclear weapons, 
was due to changes in perception that equated North Korea with its compatriots. In a 
sense, that the 386 generation took considerable control of the played a major role in 
South Korea’s remarkably low threat perception against North Korea at that time.  
D. ANALYSIS OF ROK–U.S. ALLIANCE COHESION 
The undervaluation of the North Korean threat and the resulting compatriotism 
toward the North Korean people constantly provoked the South Korean government to 
adhere to the principle of peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue. 
Inversely, as Dong Sun Lee describes, the United States “depicted North Korea as part of 
‘an axis of evil’ in [President George W. Bush’s] 2002 State of the Union address and 
pointed to [North Korea’s] missiles and weapons of mass destruction as serious security 
threats.”148 Washington also reviewed war scenarios to remove North Korean military 
risks. The mismatched policy preferences of the ROK–U.S. alliance led to serious 
conflict. Figure 4 illustrate how the Roh government’s lack of shared threat perception 
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with the United States might yield weak alliance solidarity. Points A and A’ refer to the 
Roh government’s initial threat perception and the alliance’s solidarity, respectively. On 
the other hand, point B illustrates the Korean government’s threat recognition concerning 
the Peninsula based on a perceived war crisis led by the US, and B’ indicates the 
resulting alliance cohesion. 
Figure 4.  The Roh Administration’s Alliance Cohesion 
 
 
As noted in the previous chapter, the common threats between the ROK–U.S. 
alliance are the security circumstances both surrounding North Korea and outside of the 
Korean peninsula. In this vein, the Roh administration defected from the common threat 
awareness of the alliance. However, the possibility of war between North Korea and the 
U.S. heightened the Roh administration’s sense of crisis concerning the security situation 
on the Korean peninsula, and this utterly conflicted with Roh’s preference for peacefully 
resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. Thus, as Tae Il Chung argues, despite policy 
inconsistencies, the Roh government sought, through the Iraq War troop dispatches, to 
gain leverage to sustain the peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue.149 In 
this vein, Korea’s decision to dispatch its military to Iraq was to preserve Roh’s policy 
preferences against U.S. pressure. 
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More specifically, the Roh administration, directly affected by North Korean 
military threats, wanted to take the lead and resolve the North Korean nuclear issue 
peacefully. As Tae Il Chung states: 
the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue in South Korea [required] 
U.S. cooperation. South Korea [was able to] accommodate the U.S. 
position on the dispatch and to make a turning point in recognizing the 
North Korean nuclear issue in the United States, using the international 
public opposition to the war in Iraq. South Korea considered sending 
troops to Iraq as [a strategic] opportunity to take the initiative in the ROK–
U.S. alliance, as it had a justifiable cause to persuade the United States 
from the standpoint of stability and peace in Northeast Asia. Namely, in a 
sense, by resolving the ROK–U.S. alliance’s dilemma surrounding the 
North Korean nuclear issues, [the Roh government] sought to fulfill the 
equal position between the ROK and U.S. in the nuclear issues.150 
In addition, Kwan Ok Kim, citing Min Jo’s report on the 2003 Forum of 
Unification Strategy, states that President Roh considered five elements surrounding the 
troop dispatches to Iraq: “the peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue, 
domestic public opinion, international trends, security situations in Korea and internal 
situations in Iraq.”151 As Kim further emphasizes, this reflects the Korean government’s 
desire to maintain leverage over the peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear 
crisis while strengthening the ROK–U.S. alliance through the dispatch.152  
In sum, the Roh Moo Hyun administration’s perception of security threats on the 
Korean peninsula was generally low. However, the U.S. threat of war appeared to 
threaten the peace and stability in Northeast Asia that President Roh pursued. Therefore, 
the South Korean government strategically chose to dispatch its troops to Iraq, even while 
keeping with its self-defense line, in order to adhere to its diplomatic preferences. 
Nevertheless, President Roh’s official statements, which advocated for the North Korean 
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regime, prompted the U.S. to maintain its hardline policies against North Korea and 
further blocked the ROK–U.S. alliance’s ability to reach optimal cohesion. In a sense, 
Korea’s threat deflation about North Korea further widened the alliance with the US.  
E. CONCLUSION 
This chapter examined the Roh Moo Hyun administration’s threat perception and 
alliance solidarity with the United States. The case study showed that domestic political 
factors lowered the perception of North Korean threats and decisively influenced the 
administration’s adoption of non-coherent alliance policies. Specifically, the Roh 
administration inherited Kim Dae Jung’s ‘Sunshine Policy’ and fully embraced North 
Korea. South Korea consistently insisted on the peace and prosperity of the Korean 
peninsula even as the North Korean nuclear crisis grew after that country’s NPT 
withdrawal in 2003. Moreover, the Roh administration held that even North Korea’s 
efforts to develop nuclear weapons represented an exercise of its right of self-defense. 
The Roh government’s policy toward North Korea was rooted in its low perception of 
security threats. In addition to the Sunshine Policy, President Roh’s personal pro-North 
Korean political ideology and the influence of 386 generation staff members on foreign 
policy decisions drove the government’s alliance policies. As a result, despite the 
seriousness of the North Korean nuclear crisis, South Korea adhered to the principle of 
peaceful resolution, and a self-defense policy gradually materialized in the Roh 
administration. This situation significantly decreased the ROK–U.S. alliance’s solidarity, 
resulting in political and diplomatic conflicts between the two countries. In some aspects, 
the peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear crisis and diplomatic autonomy from 
the ROK–U.S. alliance became the diplomatic hallmarks of the Roh administration. 
Yet from its strategic viewpoint, the U.S. recognition of North Korea as an 
imminent military threat, and its review of pre-emptive and preventive attack options for 
North Korean nuclear facilities, heightened the war crisis on the Korean peninsula, which 
alarmed the Korean government. Since this situation did not coincide with the diplomatic 
preferences of the Roh administration, South Korea decided on a somewhat different 
alliance policy from its original stance toward the United States in order to maintain its 
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preferred foreign policies. Thus, the Korean government dispatched its troops to the Iraq 
War. Considering that conducting a war as an allied force shows a particularly high level 
of security commitment to an alliance, it seemed considerably paradoxical that the Roh 
government, which strongly expressed anti-American sentiments, decided to send its 
military to Iraq. But amid its pursuit of autonomy, the Roh administration utilized the 
dispatch policy as political and diplomatic leverage to help manage the North Korean 
nuclear issue. In conclusion, ROK–U.S. disparity in threat perception drove South 








III. THREAT PERCEPTION IN THE PARK JUNG HEE 
ADMINISTRATION AND THE ROK–U.S. ALLIANCE COHESION  
The previous chapter discussed the Roh government’s self-reliance defense policy 
and dispatches to the Iraq War. The South Korean government’s low threat perception 
and President Roh’s diplomatic preferences directly led to such contradictions within 
alliance policy. This chapter explores the Park Jung Hee administration’s alliance policies 
and their contrast with the policy directions of the Roh government. To be more specific, 
the chapter investigates the Park government’s troop dispatches to the Vietnam War and 
its self-reliance defense policy, and it explores how the Korean government’s perception 
of its security environment at that time affected these policy decisions. 
A. THE DISPATCH TROOPS FOR THE VIETNAM WAR 
In practice, as seen in the 1961–3 Memorandum of Conversation of the Foreign 
Relations of the United States (FRUS), the South Korean government voluntarily 
proposed the dispatch of its military forces to Vietnam.153 To be more specific, according 
to the document, in the November 14, 1961, summit between the U.S. and ROK, the 
Chairman Park Jung Hee154 stated that: 
as a firm anti-Communist nation, Korea would do its best to contribute to 
the security of the Far East. North Viet-Nam had well-trained guerrilla 
forces. Korea had a million men well trained in this type of warfare. These 
men had been trained in the regular forces and were now separated. With 
U.S. approval and support, Korea could send to [Vietnam] its own troops 
or could recruit volunteers if regular troops were not desired.155 
However, as Jeong Woo Lee and Jae Hung Chung argue, because the United 
States “opposed the professed input of military power to Vietnam,” President Kennedy, 
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who insisted on a limited war against Vietnam, rejected Park’s proposal to send 
troops. 156  Nevertheless, as the two authors further mention, the Korean government 
showed its willingness to send troops to South Vietnam through special diplomats and 
trained the First Division of the Marine Corps for the potential war in preparation for the 
U.S. request for the dispatch. 157  As a whole, the Park regime wanted to actively 
participate in the war in Vietnam, and it had a political purpose as well: to strengthen the 
ROK–U.S. alliance through troop dispatch. This section explores the dispatch process 
chronologically from 1964 to 1966 and the evolving the ROK–U.S. alliance. 
1. The Process of Dispatching Troops to Vietnam 
The Park Jung Hee government dispatched its military to the Vietnam War four 
times from September 1964 to November 1966. Until ROK troops withdrew in 1972, 
around 300,000 soldiers were sent to the war and about 5,000 were killed.158 One can say 
that through the dispatches, the ROK and U.S. had a honeymoon in their relationship. 
However, despite the South Korean government’s security commitment through combat 
troop support, the debate on the withdrawal of the USFK in the context of the East Asian 
security strategy did not strengthen the solidarity of the ROK–U.S. alliance as expected. 
a. The First Dispatch 
The Park Jung Hee administration’s dispatches of troops to Vietnam began in 
1964 after the U.S. fully engaged in the conflict. As Kwan Ok Kim illustrates, the direct 
cause of the Korean government’s troop dispatches to Vietnam originated from the U.S. 
1964 “More Flags” strategy, in which the Johnson administration asked its allied powers 
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to join the Vietnam War.159 He further cites Robert McNamara’s retrospect statement 
that “after China’s communization, the United States, which recognized the danger of the 
spreading of the communist world in accordance with the domino theory, reconsidered 
the effectiveness of its limited intervention policies and eventually turned to the full-
blown intervention policy with the emergence of the Johnson administration.”160 The 
Vietnam War was the U.S. government’s strategic choice to block the expansion of 
communism in East Asia. 
In addition, faced with domestic antagonism to the Vietnam War, the United 
States called for direct and indirect military support from its twenty-five allies to secure 
domestic and foreign support for its intervention. As Kwan Ok Kim argues, the Park 
government, which received an official request for the dispatch of troops from the US, 
proposed to send its “combat troops to Vietnam,” but the Johnson administration rejected 
this.161 After this first proposal, Kim further states that “on May 21, 1964, the Korean 
government held the 5th National Security Council to decide on dispatching a field 
hospital unit and Taekwondo instructors as requested by the United States.”162 The troop 
dispatch was unanimously passed by the consent of the National Assembly. Table 1 
shows the Korean government’s dispatching pattern to Vietnam.  
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Table 2.   Korean Troop Dispatches to the Vietnam War163  
  Date Remark 
The 1st Dispatch Sep 11, 1964 The 7th Evacuation Hospital (The 1st Mobile 
Hospital): 130 
Taekwondo instructors: 1 major officer, 9 company 
grade officers 
The 2nd Dispatch Mar 10, 1965 
(Dove Unit) 
Army Engineers, Engineer Field Maintenance, 
Army Transportation Company, Marine Engineer 
Company, One LST(Landing Ship Tank) : 1,022 
Added two LSTs and volunteering forces: 
Approximately 950 
The 3rd Dispatch Oct 3, 1965 
(Cheongryong) 
Oct 16, 1965 
(Backhoe) 
Capital Divisions: 13,672 
The 2nd Marine Regiment: 4,310 
The 4th Dispatch Sep 25 – 30, 1966 Capital Divisions (The 26th, 28th, 29th and 30th 
Regiment) 
The 9th Division 
August 1967 Marines and support units: 2,963 
Increased number of infantry battalions (975 in the 
5th battalion) 
Marines brigade reorganized as marine divisions 
The 5th Dispatch Scheduled for 
summer 1968 
Canceled dispatch due to the 1968 security crisis 
 
As seen in the process of the first dispatch, the Korean government actively intended to 
participate in the Vietnam War through its proposal to send combat troops. In addition, 
the Park administration fulfilled its security commitment as an ally by sending the U.S. 
requested troops. The process of dispatching troops progressed smoothly. 
b. The Second Dispatch 
Due to the Tongkin Gulf incident164 that took place between August 2 and 4, 
1964, the Vietnam War changed from a Vietnamese civil war to an international war, and 
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the United States demanded further dispatches from its allies, including South Korea. 
According to Kwan Ok Kim, the Johnson administration “requested South Korea to 
deploy additional engineer units, which could fulfill independent operations in 
Vietnam.”165 He further states that “in response to this U.S. proposal, President Park 
suggested sending two other army divisions, instead of sending additional units of 
military engineers, but the U.S. also rejected his proposal.”166 This was because the U.S. 
worried that China and North Korea would re-invade the Korean peninsula after the 
Korean combat forces deployed in Vietnam. Although there were considerable 
differences between South Korea’s willingness to dispatch combat troops and the 
strategic calculations of the United States, the Park government decided to send its 
combat support troops, including its engineers and transport units, to Vietnam. 
Accordingly, a construction support group of about 2,000 soldiers called ‘Dove Unit’ was 
deployed to Vietnam. 
However, unlike the first dispatch, South Korea faced political opposition 
domestically while pursuing the second deployment of its military forces. In leading 
Korean political circles, there were divided opinions about the dispatch policy. In 
addition, according to Kwan Ok Kim, the Korean National Assembly emphasized 
prudence over sending troops to Vietnam and demanded the revision of the ROK–U.S. 
Mutual Defense Treaty, in which it secured the automatic intervention of the United 
States as a condition of the dispatch; in response, the U.S. pressured the Korean 
government politically while suggesting the possibility of the U.S. troop withdrawal from 
Korea.167 In practice, as Kyeong Eun Shin argues, since 1962, the United States had 
reviewed the reduction of U.S. troops in Korea as part of its new containment policy, but 
it did not inform the South Korean government of this plan.168 Ultimately, the dispatch 
policy and the reduction of the USFK resulted in divisions in Korean domestic politics, 
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and the second dispatch was carried out despite the political strife among the ruling and 
opposition parties. 
c. The Third and Fourth Dispatches 
Around February 1965, when the situation in Vietnam continued to deteriorate, 
the U.S. seriously worried about the communization of Vietnam. This situation required 
the U.S. to increase its troops. However, the work of Dong Ju Choi, as cited by Kwan Ok 
Kim, holds that “as the additional input of the U.S. troops became difficult domestically, 
the United States requested its allies to send their combat troops and officially requested 
the South Korean government to dispatch division-sized combat troops.”169 As a result, 
in October 1965, the Korean government deployed sizable combat forces to Vietnam for 
the third time. 
Yet the ratification of the third dispatch by the Korean National Assembly did not 
progress as quickly as the U.S. wanted. As Kwan Ok Kim argues, “although the Park 
government was aware that the United States urgently wanted Korea to send its troops to 
the war, [it] held off the final [decision] while suggesting its willingness to dispatch.”170 
As a result, as Kim further states, negotiations for deploying combat soldiers between 
Korea and the U.S. took place at a summit meeting during President Park’s official visit 
to the U.S. on May 17–18, 1965.171 According to the Memorandum of Conversation of 
this visit, at the bilateral summit, the United States asked South Korea to send additional 
combat troops at the scale of a division, and President Park agreed in principle with this 
request.172 However, as the Memorandum states, “President Park repeated that it was his 
personal feeling that Korea could make larger commitments of troops to [Vietnam], but 
this would have to be studied by his Government, and he could not make a commitment 
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on it at this time.” 173  One can say that the President [would have] held a highly 
advantageous position in negotiations for the dispatch, despite the Korean National 
Assembly’s delays. 
In fact, through the Korea-U.S. summit, the Korean government achieved its 
desired political outcome. As the Memorandum of Conversation on May 17, 1965 
describes, the United States promised the presence of the USFK in the Korean peninsula 
“in accordance with the 1954 [ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Agreement]” and financial aid 
for Korean economic development. 174  Through this bargaining, as Kwan Ok Kim 
emphasizes, the U.S. earned Korea’s reinforcements, and Korea dispelled the discussion 
of U.S. troop reduction from the Peninsula and ultimately strengthened its security and 
economic interests.175 In October 1965, the South Korean government deployed about 
20,000 combat troops, including the capital division, the Cheongryong unit, and the 2nd 
Marine Corps, the Backhoe unit, to the Vietnam War.176 Considering that other U.S. 
allies were lukewarm toward additional dispatches, one can say that, in a sense, the 
combined ROK–U.S. forces fought the Vietnam War. 
Additionally, the Park administration further deployed its combat soldiers to the 
war in September 1966 for the fourth time. South Korea also considerably struggled with 
the U.S. in negotiations over the fourth dispatch. As Jeong Woo Lee and Jae Hung Chung 
describe, despite its allies’ military support, the Vietnam War, which turned into guerrilla 
warfare, created an increasingly adverse situation for the United States.177 They further 
state that as a result, in December 1965, the United States officially asked Korea, which 
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attended the UN General Assembly meeting, to deploy additional combat units to 
Vietnam.178 However, according to Lee and Chung’s analysis, the Korean government: 
created the unfavorable public opinion toward the U.S. through media 
manipulation in order to take the lead in the dispatch negotiations. First, 
Korea disclosed the negotiations with the U.S. about the Korean military’s 
salary, breaking the principle of non-disclosure. Another was that Korea 
did not gain any advantage from its dispatch. In other words, the Korean 
government created a rumor that Korea sent its army to the war, but Japan 
[rather] gained economic gains from [the Korean military’s sacrifice]. 
Dealing with the [relationship] issue with Japan could fulfill both the role 
of turning the domestic criticism against the Park Jung Hee government 
and the role of raising the voice in negotiations with the United States.179 
Nevertheless, Lee and Chung argue that the U.S. persuaded the Korean 
government to dispatch more combat soldiers to Vietnam while promising to modernize 
Korea’s army.180 As a result, as the two authors note, the Korean government dispatched 
additional sizable fighting forces from the Army Division and the Marine Corps and was 
tasked with air transportation behind enemy lines through the Air Force, the Eunma 
unit. 181  Taken together, the Park Jung Hee government fully dispatched troops to 
Vietnam four times after the United States intervened in the Vietnam War. In the 
negotiation process for the additional dispatches, the South Korean government suffered 
domestic political conflicts and struggles with the U.S., but overall, it accepted American 
demands and positively responded to its requests for military deployments. One might 
say that the Park administration, through its dispatch policy, stabilized ROK–U.S. 
relations, which had drifted due to the discussion of USFK troop reduction. 
B. SELF-RELIANCE DEFENSE POLICY 
Alongside its dispatch of troops to the Vietnam War, from 1968 the Korean 
government otherwise converted its alliance policy to one of self-reliance. President Park 
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began specifically to look at ways in which South Korea could secure its own national 
security by moving away from security dependence on the ROK–U.S. alliance. Given 
that the Korean military still had forces stationed in Vietnam, one can say that South 
Korea formulated a more or less contradictory foreign policy. The Park administration 
materialized its autonomous national defense plan with two elements: force improvement 
and nuclear weapons development. This section explores the detailed plans for self-
defense that the Park Jung Hee government pursued. 
1. The Force Improvement 
President Park wanted Korea to have its own autonomous national security 
system. However, as Kyung Soo Lee argues, since U.S. grant aid constituted much of 
Korea’s defense expenditures after the Korean War until the early 1980s, the Park 
government was unable to achieve its goal of self-defense.182 He further emphasizes that 
although President Park directly referred to Korea’s self-reliance defense in a 1968 
speech, his policy began in earnest in the 1970s after the 1969 Nixon Doctrine, since no 
specific governmental plan was laid down at that time.183 In this vein, this section further 
focuses on the 1970s’ Korean government’s blue print for self-defense. 
a. Securing Operational Control 
To begin with, the Park administration strongly wanted to secure operational 
control as a means to reinforce its independent national defense. In particular, the fact 
that the ROK military could not employ independent military operations in response to 
North Korean provocations, which had rapidly increased since 1966, further increased the 
perceived need for the ROK government to secure operational control. As Hyun Soo Kim 
holds, after the North Korean surprise attack on the Blue House in 1968, the Park 
government demanded that the United States revise the exercise of military operational 
control so that ROK troops could directly counter the North’s military threat without the 
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United Nations Forces Commander (the USFK Commander)’s approval.184 He further 
argues that since the United States handed over operational control to the ROK military 
during the Vietnam War, considering the effectiveness of the combined force’s military 
operations and the Korean armed forces’ morale, it did not reject the transfer.185 As a 
result, per Kim’s emphasis, the U.S. accepted the Korean government’s request at the 
ROK–U.S. summit meeting in April 1968 and transferred some of its operational control 
in counter-guerilla operations to the Park government.186 Above all, North Korea at that 
time created security crises that threatened the Korean government’s regime survival, and 
thus securing the operational control over counter-espionage operations was a starting 
point for building Korea’s independent security system. 
More important, South Korea clearly learned lessons about its defense 
weaknesses from the Korean War and the Cold War, so it planned to gradually secure its 
military operational authority in the Korean peninsula. More specifically, as Hyun Soo 
Kim claims, the Korean government acknowledged the reality that it could not resolve its 
national security issues with its own political and military capabilities.187 As he further 
illustrates, based on this awareness, South Korea delegated its security to the ROK–U.S. 
alliance in response to potential communist forces’ attacks from countries such as the 
Soviet Union and China, and President Park restricted the goal of national self-defense to 
countering North Korean threats.188 The Park government pragmatically approached its 
independent national defense, and, further, it concentrated on securing its gradual 
autonomy from the ROK–U.S. alliance. 
b. Defense Improvement Projects 
Besides securing operational control, the Park Jung Hee administration reinforced 
its independent defense capabilities through several military initiatives. To begin with, as 
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a means of reinforcing its military strength, the Park Jung Hee government founded the 
ROK Homeland Reserve Forces in 1968. In addition, as discussed by Kyung Soo Lee, 
“since 1971, the Park government began a project to militarize its local reserve 
forces.” 189  He further mentions that “at this time, Korea’s self-defense policy 
concentrated more on the mobilization of reserve power in case of emergency [in the 
Korean peninsula] than the actual power increase such as the strengthening of the regular 
army or the defense industry.”190 This suggests that even though President Park wanted 
the ROK military to have its own defense capability, U.S. military power still took charge 
in the ROK military’s operational scheme. 
On the other hand, the Korean government activated a self-defense policy in 
earnest through the localization of defense weapons. Kyung Soo Lee argues that the Park 
and Johnson administrations agreed on fostering Korea’s defense industry in May 1968 at 
the ROK–U.S. Defense Ministers’ Meeting, and, based on this consensus, Korea 
embarked on a full-fledged effort to modernize the ROK military.191 As a result, as Hyun 
Soo Kim describes, in order to foster the foundation of its defense industry, the Korean 
government pursued the localization of basic firearms, such as ammunition and guns, and 
promoted the early force integration of cutting-edge weapons based on its own research 
and development.192 Kim further states that South Korea institutionalized an independent 
defense system through the establishment of government organizations, including the 
Agency for Defense Development (ADD).193 As Kyung Soo Lee claims, from South 
Korea’s position, since the defense industry not only allowed South Korea to reduce its 
security dependence on the United States but also gave it diplomatic leverage, the Park 
government strongly insisted on the need for its own defense industry.194 One can say 
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that the Park government’s self-defense policy was to retrieve national defense 
sovereignty through its own military and technological capabilities.   
The Park government also carried out its self-defense posture by fostering its own 
defense industry, namely the Yulgok195 project. According to Kyung Soo Lee, on April 
19, 1974, President Park directed the Ministry of National Defense regarding the first 
Yulgok project through the 8 Year Plan (1974-1981).196 He further describes that the 
Korean government specifically segmented the plan in order to realize its goal of a self-
reliant military early: first was the “imitation development and technology introduction 
production” phase (1974-1976), and second was the “complete localization of basic 
weapons and development and production of advanced strategic weapons” phase (1977-
1981).197 As a result, as Lee illustrates,  
since producing the M101 105mm gun in 1971, South Korea improved its 
defense industry’s capability to the level of production of the Bell Heli for 
the transport in 1977, and production of the MD 500, assembly of the Fiat 
6114 armored vehicle and fighter in 1978. In particular, the remodeling 
and production capacity of the M-48 A2 type tank secured basic weapon 
performance improvement and some precision weapons production at the 
end of 1970s, establishing the ROK military’s self-sufficiency of basic 
weapons and mass production of precision weapons.198 
Above all, as Peter Banseok Kwon further emphasizes, through President Park’s 
initiatives for Korea’s independent national defense, “[Yulgok] was founded as an 
independent military project under the auspices of the ROK government, apart from any 
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[U.S.] input and funded by the Korean people.”199 As described by Kyung Soo Lee, 
before the Yulgok project, “in April 1973, President Park directed the ROK Joint Chiefs 
of Staff (JCS) to increase Korean military power as a specific implementation plan for his 
self-defense.”200 More specifically, Kwon states that President Park ordered the ROK 
JCS to conduct the following four tasks: 
• Formulate military plans for participation in [a] self-reliant national 
defense policy and military buildup. 
• Formulate long-term military strategy to prepare for the transfer of [U.S.] 
Operation Control (OPCON) to South Korea. 
• Based on heavy and chemical industrialization (HCI), indigenize the 
production of necessary weapons and military equipment except for 
advanced fight jets and missiles. 
• With the expectation that no [U.S.] troops will remain in South Korea by 
the 1980s, the JCS must develop South Korea’s independent military 
strategy and “Force Improvement Plan”201 
As a result, as described in the Korea National Archive, including increasing the 
army’s defense capabilities, the ROK Navy and Air Force introduced new weapons to 
replace the aging combat forces.202 Thus, through this modernization project, the Park 
government strengthened the ROK military’s operational capability. Table 2 shows major 
changes in the ROK military in line with the Yulgok project.  
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Table 3.   Major Activities of Force Improvement Plan, 1974–1994203  
 
Figures are in the current Korean won. 
As a whole, the Park administration laid a solid foundation for building an 
independent national defense system through the expansion of reserve forces, localization 
of basic weapons, and improvement of defense capabilities. However, the South Korean 
government’s self-defense policy was somewhat limited in that it still did not provide for 
an ability to independently produce advanced military weapons. Ultimately, the Park 
regime sought a way to reinforce its defense vulnerability in the short term, and it 
embarked on a nuclear weapons development project. 
2. Nuclear Weapons Development 
More than anything else, the Park Jung Hee government sought to complete its 
self-reliant national defense policy through a nuclear weapons development program. As 
Sang Chul Cha mentions, President Park strongly wanted to have sufficient independent 
military capabilities to defeat North Korea without U.S. military assistance. 204  Cha 
further mentions that through this self-defense policy, the Park government 
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fundamentally sought strategic military assets such as nuclear weapons, which President 
Park believed could let Korea overcome the inferiority of its conventional military power 
against North Korea.205 The Korean government decided to develop nuclear weapons 
that could suppress the North Korean military threats without the U.S. security umbrella 
as a final step toward establishing its own independent defense system. 
The Park administration officially declared its plan for developing nuclear 
weapons on June 12, 1975. However, its actual plan was established in the early 1970s. 
Taik Young Hamm argues that as the United States “reduced its military aid to [South 
Korea] in the early 1970s as a warning against the authoritarian rule and human rights 
abuses of the Park regime, [President Park] sought self-sufficiency in defense, budgeting 
[his own] arms production and [a] covert nuclear weapons [program].”206 As Kyung Soo 
Lee mentions, the Korean government organized a nuclear weapons development plan 
centered on The Ministry of National Defense (MND) and ADD on May 10, 1972 and 
launched full-fledged nuclear development in December of that year.207 According to 
Sang Chul Cha, although the Park regime secretly pursued nuclear development, after 
India successfully conducted its nuclear test in May 1974, the United States, concerned 
about the nuclear domino effect in East Asia, carried out nuclear weapons inspections in 
developing countries, and the U.S. discovered Korea’s nuclear weapons development 
projects in the process.208  
This discovery brought about significant conflict in the ROK–U.S. alliance, since 
the U.S. did not want Korea to have a nuclear capability, fearing its potential loss of 
control over South Korea. However, as Cha argues, Park Jung Hee officially proclaimed 
the development of nuclear weapons despite the political pressure and opposition of the 
United States in June 1975 because he had a strong desire to move away from the U.S. 
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nuclear umbrella and develop Korea into a military sovereign nation.209 Yet South Korea 
ultimately gave up its nuclear development plan as a result of U.S. pressure, and the 
ROK–U.S. alliance faced a crisis. Taken together, the Park regime’s self-reliant military 
policy was for resolving its increasing security threats, but it rather aggravated Korea’s 
security crisis by undermining the solid ROK–U.S. alliance. As a small power in an 
asymmetric alliance, the ROK faced considerable restrictions on securing its diplomatic 
autonomy. 
C. THE PARK ADMINISTRATION’S THREAT PERCEPTION 
In contrast to the Roh administration, in the Park administration it was high threat 
perception that drove contradictory alliance policies. To be more specific, South Korea 
further heightened its concerns over its national security in response to a combination of 
three factors: 1) the inferiority of conventional forces responding to North Korea, 2) the 
surging North Korean invasion, and 3) the USFK’s withdrawal plan. This psychological 
uneasiness provoked the South Korean government to convert its alliance policies from 
ones exemplified by troop dispatches to Vietnam to ones exemplified by an independent 
self-reliance policy. Above all, the proclamation of the Nixon Doctrine imposed an 
existential threat on the Park government. To investigate this systemic conversion of 
Korea’s foreign policies, this section first explores the South Korean government’s 
attitude toward North Korea. Through this, one can understand the Park regime’s threat 
perception toward North Korea. It will then analyze the domestic and international events 
that decisively impacted Korea’s threat perception. 
1. South Korea’s Position toward North Korea: Anti-Communism after 
the Korean War 
After the Korean War, anti-communism became a principle of South Korean 
governments, particularly Park Jung Hee’s administration. Naturally, the government 
regarded North Korea as a primary threat to South Korea’s security. In the 1950s, post-
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war reconstruction and the United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission 
(UNCMAC)’s surveillance underestimated North Korea’s attempts to infiltrate South 
Korea. However, as Yoon Gyu Lee argues, in the 1960s, North Korea, exploiting the 
political turmoil of the South Korean government, launched more intensive local 
provocations to unify the Peninsula under communism.210 Figure 5 shows the trend of 
North Korean military provocations by year, and one can infer that Korea had a 
considerable security crisis on its hands in the 1960s.  
Figure 5.  The Trend of North Korean Provocations after the Armistice211  
 
Axis ‘X’ and ‘Y’ stand for year and number of provocations, respectively. 
Particularly in the late 1960s, as Robert Lauler illustrates, South Korea felt that 
the “threat of attack from North Korea was as high as ever and even likened the drastic 
rise in North-South Clashes along the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) as a possible 
harbinger of an invasion.”212 Above all, since the conventional capabilities of the North 
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Korean military were superior to South Korea’s at that time, the North’s apparent 
attempts to invade aggravated the Park administration’s unrest. As a whole, the North 
Korean threat produced considerable psychological fear for the Park administration in 
terms of regime security. Above all, the South Korean government defined North Korea 
as an immediate threat, and this necessitated a strong military power to deter North 
Korean attempts to unify the Korean peninsula under communism. From this perspective, 
the ROK–U.S. alliance was an essential tool for Korea’s national security. 
2. Root Causes of the Park Administration’s High Threat Perception 
Apart from the Park administration’s alliance policies, this section explores what 
determined the South Korean government’s threat perception regarding the Korean 
peninsula. In the Park administration, unlike in Roh’s case, international factors drove its 
threat perception. To be more specific, as Sung Joo Han argues, since South Korea 
heavily relied upon the U.S., particularly in terms of security, certain changes in U.S. 
alliance policies fostered Korea’s anxiety. 213  In particular, the Korean government 
connected potential USFK’s withdrawal to South Korea’s ability to survive. Thus, this 
section explores the Park administration’s threat perception in the context of alliance 
security dilemmas.  
a. Impact of the North Korean Provocations 
Rapidly increasing North Korean provocations in the late 1960s aggravated Park 
Jung Hee government’s security crisis. In fact, as seen above in Figure 5, the number of 
North Korean southward provocations increased sharply after the Park regime dispatched 
its soldiers to Vietnam, from 1965 to 1968. As described in the Memorandum of Alfred 
Jenkins of the National Security Council the President’s Special Assistant on July 26, 
1967, both the ROK and U.S. regarded North Korea’s provocations as attempts to subvert 
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the South Korean regime.214 President Park was particularly afraid of the possibility that 
North Korean guerilla activities would develop into a destructive military conflict.215 
Table 2 shows the number of inter-Korean collisions and casualties at that time.  
Table 4.   The North Korean Attacks and Casualties216 
Index 1965 1966 1967 to Date 
DMZ Incidents 42 37 286 
Firefights (DMZ 
plus interior) 
29 30 132 
NK, KIA 34 43 146 
NK, captured after 
firefights 
Not comparable 35 (excludes 
police pick-ups) 
N/A 
ROK/[U.S.], KIA 40 39 75 
ROK/[U.S.], WIA 49 34 175 
 
On January 23, North Korea captured the USS Pueblo, which was gathering 
information off the coast of Wonsan. This incident showed that the ROK and the U.S. 
faced serious disagreements over responses to North Korean provocations. In some 
aspects, the ROK–U.S. alliance began to deviate from its “comfortable nest.”  
To be more specific, the two countries were apparently unified, but had different 
outlooks in terms of responding to North Korea. As illustrated in the Telegram from the 
Embassy in Korea to the Department of State on February 12, 1968, the South Korean 
government was “charged with [a] deep conviction that [Pyongyang was] on the path of 
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war.”217 Accordingly, while Seoul, which felt the threat of a North Korean invasion, 
strongly insisted on retaliation against North Korea, as Kyung Eun Shin’s analysis shows, 
Washington recognized that the intense provocations of North Korea did not signal an 
all-out war, but rather that it wanted to divert U.S. attention concentrated in Vietnam to 
the Korean peninsula in order to help the expansion of the Communist forces in North 
Vietnam.218 As noted in the Memorandum to Holders of Special National Intelligence 
Estimate Number 14.2–67 on February 29, 1968, the United States believed that the 
Soviet Union and China not only were reluctant to intervene in the new war on the 
Peninsula but also would restrain the North’s invasion attempts.219 Taken together, while 
the United States objectively judged the situation on the Korean peninsula from a global 
strategic point of view, South Korea perceived a crisis in the South-North confrontation. 
Furthermore, threat perception between the ROK and the U.S. toward North Korea 
significantly diverged. This strained alliance cohesion.  
In addition, the U.S. secret deal with North Korea to repatriate the crews of the 
Pueblo catalyzed the ROK–U.S. alliance’s split. As Kyeong Eun Shin argues, the ROK 
viewed the U.S.-North Korea negotiations as a reflection of Washington’s lukewarm 
attitude towards South Korean security.220 As shown in the Memorandum from Cyrus R. 
Vance to President Johnson, the South Korean administration “doubted both the resolve 
of the United States and [its] commitment in Korea…[President Park] also felt that the 
discussions infringed on ROK sovereignty.”221 Also, in the process of resolving the two 
security crises of 1968, although the United States pledged to provide weapons to the 
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Korean government for military modernization in order to alleviate South Korea’s 
dissatisfaction, South Korea’s existential threat perception, which originated from the fact 
that its government could be subverted by the North at any time, outweighed the U.S. 
security commitment. As Tae Gyun Park puts it, despite South Korea’s dispatch of its 
combat troops for the United States, the psychological gaps between the ROK and the 
U.S. were sufficient to prompt the Park regime’s defection.222 Ultimately, U.S. actions 
induced South Korea’s fear of abandonment. This was definitely “the calm before the 
storm” of the ROK–U.S. alliance’s rift.  
b. Détente between the United States and the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) 
In addition to inter-Korean situations, the international political environment 
outside the Korean peninsula further aggravated Korea’s threat perception. In particular, 
the U.S. plan to withdraw the USFK, which was revealed in 1969 by the United States in 
the Guam Doctrine Declaration and the 1971 the U.S.-PRC secret talks, overlapped with 
North Korea’s military provocations and provided Korea with an existential crisis. This 
section investigates these international factors in details.  
(1) The 1969 Guam Doctrine and South Korea’s Anxiety 
The so-called “Guam Doctrine” announced by President Richard Nixon on July 
25, 1969, accelerated South Korea’s anxiety about its security shield. As Richard 
Thornton mentions, the United States strategically conceived of rapprochement with the 
PRC to restrain the Soviet expansionism that emerged through the Sino-Soviet border 
dispute in January 1969 and tried to regain its hegemony, lost during the Vietnam 
War.223 In this aspect, as Thornton further notes, Nixon withdrew American forces by 
declaring the “Vietnamization” of the Vietnam War, permitting China to “counter the 
large Soviet border buildup.”224 However, the U.S. initiation of the armistice deal for 
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ending the Vietnam War after the “Tet offensive” resumed the USFK’s withdrawal in the 
Korean peninsula, halted during the war. With this Vietnamization, Nixon announced 
that:  
the United States would honor its treaty commitments, but [he] added 
“that as far as the problems of military defense, except for the threat of a 
major power involving nuclear weapons, that the United States is going to 
encourage and has a right to expect that this problem will be handled by, 
and responsibility for it taken by, the Asian nations themselves.”225  
Simultaneously, according to Tae Gyun park, Nixon withdrew some U.S. troops 
stationed in East Asia, including Vietnam.226 However, as Park argues, Nixon’s action 
put the Park administration in the middle of the security crisis. 227  Park further 
emphasizes that not only did the U.S. not notify the South Korean government about the 
withdrawal until the concrete plan for the reduction of U.S. troops in late 1969, but Nixon 
was also considering the complete withdrawal of the USFK from the Korean 
peninsula. 228  As he notes, in 1966, since the U.S. mutually agreed upon policy 
coordination for the USFK, the Nixon Doctrine undermined confidence in the ROK–U.S. 
relationship. 229  Thus, the doctrine became a turning point for South Korea’s 
determination to reduce its dependence on the alliance and consider its own defense 
measures. 
(2) The 1971 Secret Meetings and Shanghai Communique between the U.S. 
and PRC 
Crucially, before the Shanghai Communiqué on February 28, 1972, two secret 
meetings between the U.S. and the PRC on July 9 and October 22, 1971, further 
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provoked South Korean government suspicions about the U.S. defense commitment. As 
Jeong Kyung Seo describes, because the U.S. did not disclose the results of the talks to 
the Park regime, this fundamentally aggravated South Korea’s fear about its security and 
the distrust of the U.S. protection.230 To be more specific, as Sang Chul Cha argues, since 
the reduction of the USFK progressed from July 1970 to June 1971 and the Park 
government expected that the issue of the USFK’s withdrawal could be treated as a major 
agenda item in the U.S.-PRC meeting, the secret talks themselves created a fear of 
abandonment.231 South Korea was subordinate within the U.S. security architecture. This 
situation prompted the Park administration to consider escaping the shade of the ROK–
U.S. alliance. 
In fact, diplomatic documents written by Winston Lord state that in the first and 
second secret meetings between National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger and Premier 
Zhou Enlai on July 9, 1971 and October 22, respectively, the two sides discussed largely 
Taiwan’s sovereignty, the withdrawal of U.S. forces in Vietnam, and security issues on 
the Korean peninsula.232 According to the secret documents “Korea, Japan, South Korea, 
Soviet Union, Arms Control” and “Memcon of Your Conversation with Chou En-lai” 
reproduced by the National Security Archives, among these issues, China put pressure on 
the United States, referring to the withdrawal of the USFK. 233  The PRC, as the 
documents illustrate, especially emphasized the immediate withdrawal of the USFK in 
South Korea and its opposition to the presence of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces 
(JSDF) in the South after the withdrawal of the USFK.234 More importantly, Kissinger 
replied that “[the U.S. is] willing to sign an agreement with [the PRC] on the basis of the 
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Five Points of Peaceful Principle of Coexistence.”235 As Jeong Kyung Seo analyzes, 
however, the U.S. did not inform the Park administration about the withdrawal 
agreement, which was in the vital interests of South Korea.236 Seo further mentions that 
in the ROK–U.S. Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) on July 12, 1971, held two days 
after the U.S.-PRC secret talks, Washington restated its strong defense commitment for 
South Korea, but at the same time, it denied Park’s official requests for summit talks to 
discuss the contents of the secret meeting. 237 This dual attitude of the United States 
possibly reinforced South Korea’s existing distrust about the alliance and created the 
extreme security tension of the Park regime.  
Moreover, although the U.S. did not disclose the content of the 1971 U.S.-PRC 
secret meeting, the Shanghai Communique announced on February 28, 1972, gave South 
Korea a deep impression that the United States thoroughly managed the Cold War 
through pragmatism. For example, as Victor Cha notes, through the communique, “[the 
U.S. and the PRC] agreed that allies and enemies need not be defined by ideology but by 
the content of their foreign policy and consequently recognized their shared interests in 
avoiding a disruption of the status quo.”238 Cha further states that “[Washington] did not 
challenge Beijing’s ‘one-China’ principle, and [Beijing] tacitly accepted the U.S. need to 
maintain some form of defense commitment to Taipei.” 239  Although the U.S. could 
pursue its national interests through this strategic ambiguity, the cracks and conflicts of 
the ROK–U.S. alliance gradually reached an unmanageable level. As a result of the 
rapprochement between the U.S. and the PRC, the South Korean regime became 
convinced that the U.S. willingness to protect South Korea was only an ideational 
commitment.  
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D. ANALYSIS OF ROK–U.S. ALLIANCE COHESION 
As mentioned above, the ROK and the U.S. showed a relatively strong alliance 
through deploying soldiers to Vietnam. However, the USFK’s withdrawal plan and North 
Korean attempts to overthrow the South made President Park perceive an existential 
crisis over a potential military invasion by Pyongyang. According to Janice Stein, 
“[states] strongly prefer consistency…they consequently deny or discount inconsistent 
information to preserve their existing beliefs…exposure to contradictory information 
frequently results in the strengthening of [the existing perception].” 240  U.S. threat 
awareness and alliance policies, which contradicted the existing Park regime’s threat 
recognition system, exacerbated South Korea’s anxiety and functioned as a centrifugal 
force, pushing the ROK away from the alliance. Based on this analysis, Figure 6 shows 
the transition of the ROK–U.S. alliance cohesion in the Park administrations. Points C 
and D indicate the deterioration of the Korean government’s threat perception, and Point 
C’ and D’ indicate changes in the cohesiveness of the ROK–U.S. alliance. 
Figure 6.  The Park Administration’s Alliance Cohesion 
 
As a result, President Park declared a self-reliant defense plan, which contradicted 
the troop dispatches. In August 1970, per Sang Chul Cha’s analysis, South Korea 
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established the Agency for Defense Development (ADD) to advance its own capabilities 
for weapons development, fundamentally aiming at escaping security dependence on the 
United States. 241  In addition, Cha mentions that after December 1971, the Park 
administration “began developing strategic missiles and nuclear weapons,” and officially 
declared its nuclear weapons development program in 1975.242 However, as Cha puts it, 
since the U.S. was concerned that South Korea’s nuclear weapons program could not 
only lead to the “nuclear domino” phenomenon in East Asia but also provoke the alliance 
systems led by America to break, Washington impeded Seoul’s independent actions 
through its coercive power.243 Cha further emphasizes that the ROK–U.S. alliance finally 
reached the crisis of the alliance’s dissolution in 1976, following the declaration of the 
unilateral withdrawal of the USFK by President Jimmy Carter.244 Taken together, the 
Park Jung Hee regime’s existential threat perception dramatically converted South 
Korea’s alliance policies from one exemplified by troop dispatches to one rooted in self-
reliant defense. Furthermore, in this process, the ROK–U.S. alliance lost its original 
function to deter North Korea. In short, the alliance’s cohesion considerably weakened.  
E. CONCLUSION 
This chapter showed that in the case of the Park government, in contrast to that of 
the Roh government, international factors such as North Korean provocations and a 
change in U.S. alliance policies exacerbated Korea’s threat perception. Since the Korean 
government did not have military power competitive enough to counter North Korea in 
the 1960s and 1970s, both increasing North Korean attempts to invade the South and the 
Korean distrust of the U.S. security umbrella, which was based on the reduction of the 
USFK, raised Korea’s psychological attention to an impending existential threat. Above 
all, the Nixon Doctrine in 1969, the 1971 U.S.-China secret talks, and the withdrawal 
plan of the USFK drove the Park government’s security threat perception through the 
roof. Then, as Cha suggests, from the South Korean perspective, the 1972 Shanghai 
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Communique catalyzed the Korean government’s gradually worsening security unrest.245 
Thus, external factors fundamentally exacerbated the Korean government’s perception of 
the security environment on the Peninsula. 
In addition, this chapter illustrated that this shift in the Park government’s threat 
perception led to a change of its alliance policies, from the troop dispatch to Vietnam to a 
self-reliance defense policy. When analyzing each policy on a chronological basis, the 
Park administration, like the Roh government, implemented incoherent foreign policies. 
As mentioned in this chapter, the Korean government’s threat awareness was the root 
cause of these inconsistent alliance policies. Korea and the U.S. participated in the 
Vietnam War based on their common threat perception regarding communist forces. 
Although South Korea sought to strengthen its diplomatic ties to the United States 
through its dispatches, the plan to reduce the USFK, which created a disparity of threat 
perception between the two countries, did not create the optimal alliance that Korea 
wanted. Above all, the Korean government’s plan to develop its own nuclear weapons 
damaged U.S. strategic interests on the Peninsula, significantly furthering the ROK–U.S. 
relationship’s rift. It is no exaggeration to say that the ROK–U.S. relations in the 1970s 
depended on U.S. attitudes and foreign policies about South Korea. From a structural 
viewpoint, South Korea, a small power within the asymmetric ROK–U.S. alliance, had 
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This thesis has explored the Roh Moo Hyun and Park Jung Hee governments’ 
threat perception regarding North Korea and their surrounding security environments on 
the Korean peninsula and investigated how these helped shift Korean governments’ 
alliance policies. In particular, the thesis focused on these governments’ shifts between 
troop dispatches and self-reliance defense policies. Through this process, the thesis 
demonstrated an ‘inverted U relationship’ between South Korea’s threat perception and 
ROK–U.S. alliance cohesion, based on the two hypotheses of the thesis: first, if Korea’s 
threat perception falls either below the common threat shared with the U.S. or above the 
level of an existential threat to Korea, the ROK will take action to show or withdraw its 
commitment in response to a relatively small increase in threat perception. Second, if 
South Korea meets an existential threat, it tends to pursue an independent defense policy, 
since it doubts the U.S. willingness to protect it.  
The Roh Moo Hyun government overall maintained a low perception of security 
threats, which increased the distance between the two countries. The government 
addressed North Korean military threats and even that country’s possession of nuclear 
weapons based on its pro-North foreign policy line. Above all, South Korea aimed to 
peacefully resolve North Korean nuclear issues and adopted the ‘peace and prosperity’ 
stance on the Peninsula as its ideal of foreign policy. In a sense, this approach distorted 
the security environment of the Korean peninsula into something appearing quite stable. 
In the end, Korea’s threat deflation and consequent engagement stance toward North 
Korea made the ROK–U.S. relationship considerably remote. 
Meanwhile, from the beginning of the Roh administration, the ROK government 
paved the way for South Korea’s independent defense capability by promoting the return 
of wartime operational control and the 2020 defense reform plan. However, as the United 
States observed imminent threats connected to North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT 
and its nuclear weapons development and created a war-crisis environment on the Korean 
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peninsula, this became a significant obstacle for the South Korean government’s attempts 
to maintain its diplomatic preferences. As the United States gradually created the 
possibility of war, this increased Korea’s threat perception. Based on this awareness, the 
Roh administration decided to transact its preferences and autonomy with the U.S. in 
order to maintain its favored policies. The exchange led South Korea to send its troops to 
the Iraq War. Overall, then, the Roh government showed an inconsistent pattern in its 
foreign policies. The Korean government’s threat deflation was at the core of this 
contradiction, and this devolved the ROK–U.S. alliance into crisis. 
In contrast, the Park government had perpetual tension in its national security 
policy and adhered to a relatively high threat perception. South Korea, which directly 
faced ideological confrontation through the Korean War, considerably feared the 
expansion of communist forces, including North Korea. Above all, it was afraid of North 
Korea’s southward invasion and the unification of the Peninsula under communism. 
Amid the Cold War, the Korean government in the 1960s and 1970s basically shared the 
anti-communism ideology of the U.S. and was able to maintain a relatively friendly 
relationship with the U.S. as an axis of the liberal camp. In this vein, one can say that a 
certain level of military tension within the inter-Korean relationship created a favorable 
environment for Korea and the U.S. to optimally perform as an alliance.  
Yet the issue of USFK troop reduction gradually marginalized the ROK–U.S. 
alliance’s optimal performance. This situation provoked the Park Jung Hee 
administration to dispatch its military to the Vietnam War in 1964. Through the 
dispatches, South Korea aimed to stabilize its relationship with the U.S., but the U.S. 
continued its plan of rebalancing its military forces on the Peninsula even during the 
Vietnam War. Therefore, the Korean government became distrustful about the U.S. 
security commitment, and dissonance between the ROK and U.S. gradually grew. In 
other words, contrary to South Korea’s expectations, increasing security threats fairly 
weakened the ROK–U.S. alliance’s solidarity.  
Simultaneously, the alliance and North Korea created a hazardous international 
environment that worsened the Park government’s anxiety regarding its security. The 
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South Korean regime came to believe that its security was more threatened than ever 
before through the Blue House raid in January 1968. Moreover, the United States 
response to the Pueblo incident in February 1968, apparently rooted only in its national 
interests, led South Korea to fear that the U.S. would actually abandon it. In addition, a 
chain of international events – the Nixon Doctrine in 1969, the 1971 U.S.-China secret 
talks, and the withdrawal plan of the USFK – exacerbated the Park government’s worries 
over the U.S. security commitment. Ultimately, this resulted in psychological panic on 
the part of the South Korean government.  
As a result, South Korea strongly proceeded with its self-reliance defense policy 
to ensure its security without U.S. military support. Among the smaller policies that 
emerged from this, through its nuclear weapons development project, Korea ultimately 
desired to break from its structural dependence on the ROK–U.S. alliance. However, 
since this policy conflicted with U.S. strategic interests, it was interrupted by U.S. 
coercive power. This ultimately undercut the ROK–U.S. alliance. Taken together, the 
security crises in and out of the Korean peninsula gradually deteriorated the Park Jung 
Hee government’s threat perception, and this helped bring about the contradictory shift of 
its alliance policies. In contrast with the Roh government, the Park administration’s threat 
inflation catalyzed the ROK–U.S. alliance’s strain.  
B. IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTH KOREA  
Through a comparative study between the Roh and Park administrations, this 
thesis found that since Korea is a small power in an asymmetric alliance, it is structurally 
difficult for the Korean government to shape its foreign relations with the U.S. and its 
desired national defense mechanism. This suggests that the external security environment 
of Korea can shape the ROK–U.S. alliance mechanism. For instance, the Roh Moo Hyun 
government dispatched its troops to Iraq to defend its diplomatic preferences while 
maintaining its independent national defense and anti-American stance, but this was 
ultimately based on Korea’s recognition that the United States could decisively influence 
the Korean peninsula security issue. The United States has significantly impacted Korea’s 
threat perception and decision-making. 
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1. Influence of Domestic Factors on the ROK–U.S. Alliance 
But the domestic politics of South Korea have also influenced its alliance policies 
and international relations. Since South Korea is in an asymmetric alliance with the 
United States, it generally falls in line with U.S. perceptions and policy intentions 
regarding the international security environment. However, as Sung Hoon Lee asserts, at 
least in the Roh administration, the ROK–U.S. alliance “was not simply a by-product of 
the U.S. [East Asian] strategy and foreign policies.”246 In this line, the South Korean 
government showed that decision makers, including presidents, could influence the 
ROK’s alliance policy toward the United States based on Korea’s political beliefs and 
situational awareness regarding the international environment.  
Korean politicians should remain impartially aware of the security environment 
on the Korean peninsula. In order to deter North Korea’s military threats, it is important 
to strengthen the ROK–U.S. alliance’s cohesion and establish a common threat 
perception about the security environment on the Peninsula. Currently, North Korea’s 
possession of nuclear weapons and inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) imposes 
an existential threat on the security of the United States as well as South Korea. If South 
Korea, like the Roh government in the past, blindly embraces North Korea, then the 
cracks in the ROK–U.S. alliance will deepen. The ROK–U.S. alliance is still an important 
security mechanism for South Korea. Considering that South Korea’s political stance 
toward Pyongyang can considerably impact the performance of the alliance, South 
Korean political leaders and bureaucrats should objectively recognize the security 
situation on the Korean peninsula.  
2. Impact of Imbalanced Threat Awareness on the ROK–U.S. Alliance  
The ROK–U.S. alliance is a typical asymmetric relationship. Therefore, the views 
of the two countries regarding the security situation on the Peninsula have diverged. In 
particular, South Korea, which directly confronts North Korean military threats through 
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the DMZ, cannot make an representative and neutral judgment on the security crisis on 
the Korean peninsula. Considering that the Korean War has not yet ended legally, the 
South Korean government can see North Korea’s intense local provocations as 
reinitiating the war. With this in mind, the U.S. security commitment to South Korea, 
which utilizes the ROK–U.S. alliance as its main deterrence mechanism against North 
Korean threats, importantly determines the ROK’s threat perception.  
However, South Korea still doubts U.S. defense commitments regarding current 
North Korean nuclear issues. While South Korea has requested substantial defense 
assistance from the U.S. against the North’s nuclear weapons, Washington has only 
deployed its strategic air force assets temporarily to the Peninsula. This suggests a huge 
gap between the ROK and U.S. in terms of interpreting North Korean nuclear threats. 
Above all, the more sophisticated North Korean nuclear weapons become, the more acute 
South Korea’s threat perception will be, and the ROK could begin to consider dissolving 
the alliance as it had in the past. Therefore, in order for Korea to avoid cracks and 
conflicts in the alliance, it should remain clear-eyed in recognizing North Korean threats 
and the security environment on the Peninsula. In a sense, South Korea should strive to 
balance its threat awareness with the U.S. 
C. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
This thesis explored how the Korean government’s psychological factors 
influenced the ROK–U.S. alliance’s cohesion, and how subjective elements in the 
alliance’s politics can drive the relationship between the two states. However, the thesis 
has four limitations that should provoke scholars to conduct additional study on the 
ROK–U.S. alliance’s future status. 
First, the author did not objectively analyze the two Korean governments’ threat 
perceptions. The thesis relied on a qualitative analysis of the presidents’ official 
statements, officials’ memoirs, and historical records to evaluate their perceptions. This 
might detract from the credibility of the thesis. Therefore, future research needs to secure 
evidence to more objectively verify Korea’s threat perception. This would reinforce the 
reliability of supplementary studies. 
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 Second, while discussing Korean governments’ self-defense policy, the author 
broadly illustrated this through concrete case studies, but did not precisely define the type 
of autonomy pursued by the Roh and Park governments. Since the newly-emerged Moon 
Jae In administration has also been seen to be pursuing an independent national defense 
for South Korea, future in-depth analysis of this could provide lessons on the viability of 
South Korean security autonomy. 
Third, the thesis began with the premise that Korea employs the ROK–U.S. 
alliance as its most important security mechanism. However, among various policies that 
can strengthen the alliance, the author did not clearly state why Korea focused upon the 
political burden of sending troops to war, as opposed to other tools to this end. Future 
research might more deeply explore why (or whether) troop dispatch represents an 
alliance-strengthening mechanism strong enough to counterbalance other, alliance-
weakening policies pursued at the same time. Such a study could better establish small 
powers’ ability to manage diplomatic relations with great powers. 
Fourth, the thesis mainly took a realist approach to the ROK–U.S. alliance, 
ignoring other points of view in the process. The author argued that domestic political 
factors and the security environment in Korea during the Roh and Park administrations 
fundamentally impacted their threat awareness. However, since norms and institutions of 
the international community greatly affect international relations, it is also necessary to 
approach the Korean government’s threat recognition from a constructivist point of view. 
A future, more comprehensive analysis that combines realism and constructivism might 
further refine the correlation between Korea’s threat perception and ROK–U.S. alliance 
cohesion. 
All in all, from a psychological point of view, this thesis analyzed how a small 
power’s threat recognition can influence relations with a great power, using the ROK–
U.S. alliance as its case study. If future studies complement the above limitations, we 
might identify more diverse elements, including but not limited to psychological factors, 
that might affect the ROK–U.S. relationship.  
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